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Lately, most Arab region countries have cultivated the new economic reformation 
which often linked with economic growth and its ability to enhance financial 
deepening. This study investigates the government ownership and its association 
with firm performance. The study used 103 public listed samples on Amman Stock 
Exchange from 2011-2015. The data measures the relationship of three levels of 
government ownership with a median point of 28% as well as full government 
ownership and six financial ratios as control variables to firm performance (ROA, 
ROE and EPS). Based on the multiple linear regression method with the use of SPSS 
package, four sets of different regression analysis have been conducted and found 
statistically mixed results when takes into consideration the year effect and level of 
government ownership. An insignificant relationship was found between government 
ownership concentration (breaking up the level of government ownership) and firm 
performance (ROA, ROE and EPS) when year effect was taken into consideration. 
However, when year effect was ignored, significant results found for EPS only and 
conclude low government ownership negatively related with firm performance.  
When full government ownership was used without breaking up the level of 
government ownership, the statistical result is positively linked with firm 
performance. The ROE is positively related at 5% significant level when its R-
Square is 16.9%. A Similar finding was found when the year effect was ignored. It 
also found that control variables like long term debt to total assets and age are 
consistently significant at 1% with all three dependent variables. Meaning, the longer 
the firm has been established the better the financial performance of the firm. On the 
other hand, higher level government ownership may help to boost the firm 


















Sejak kebelakangan ini, negara-negara arab memasuki era reformasi ekonomi baru 
yang sering dikaitkan dengan pencapaian ekonomi dan kebolehan mengecapi 
kewangan yang mendalam. Kajian ini bertujuan mengkaji hubungan pegangan saham 
kerajaan dalam syarikat awam dan prestasi syarikat tersebut. Kajian ini mengambil-
kira 103 sampel syarikat yang tersenarai di Bursa Saham Amman (Jordan) dari 2011-
2015. Data ini digunakan untuk mengkaji kaitan pegangan saham kerajaan yang di 
pecahkan kepada tiga takat pegangan melalui nisbah 28% sebagai ‘median point’dan 
tanpa dipecahkan iaitu pegangan penuh saham kerajaan dalam syarikat tersebut 
bersama enam nisbah kewangan  yang berfungsi sebagai ‘control variables’ untuk 
menilai prestasi syarikat yang dinilai oleh nisbah ‘ROA, ROE dan EPS’. Kajian ini 
juga menggunakan kaedah ‘Multiple Linear Regression’ dengan bantuan SPSS. 
Keputusan kajian ini telah menyumbang kepada empat analisa ‘regression’yang 
berlainan. Keputusan ini juga mengambil-kira impak tahunan dan kesan berlainan 
takat pegangan saham kerajaan dalam syarikat awam.  
Kajian ini mendapati, hubungan antara berbagai takat saham syarikat kerajaan 
dengan prastasi syarikat masih dinilakan terlalu kecil walaupun impak tahunan tidak 
diambil-kira. Keputusan demikian menyimpul bahawa pegangan saham kerajaan 
yang rendah dalam syarikat awam menyumbang kepada hubungan negative kepada 
prestasi kewangan syarikat. Walaubagaimanapun, keputusan positif didapati jika 
pegangan saham kerajaan penuh diuji. Keputusan positif ini memberikan nilai nisbah 
ROE 5% ‘significant’ bila R-Square nya adalah 16.9%. Keputusan ini masih selari 
jika impak tahunan tidak diambil-kira. Keputusan kajian ini dari sudut ‘control 
variables’ seperti nisbah kewangan ‘long term debt to total assets’ dan nisbah ‘age’ 
adalah selari dengan ‘dependent variables’. Keputusan ini menyimpulkan bahawa 
lebih lama usia syarikat berurusan dalam perniagaan lebih hebat prestasi kewangan 
syarikat. Manakala dari sudut yang lain jika pegangan saham kerajaan dalam syarikat 
awam adalah tinggi akan membrangsangkan prestasi syarikat sekiranya ada 
penglibatan kerajaan yang dikaitkan dengan (Wasta). 
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In the recent decade Middle Eastern countries are driving to develop their 
economy by cultivating openness and getting more outside capital rather 
than being too dependable on its own government funding. This intention is 
consistent with Jordanian firms that expand their business operation and 
activities by privatizing some of their government owned firms. The 
Jordanian government privatized their program since early nineties. It is an 
on-going program that supports the participation of the private sector in 
economic growth. The Jordanian government privatization action plan was 
adopted as part of the economic package. This plan was expected to help to 
adjust the economy especially since the aftermath of economic crisis in 
early nineties. Since then the government adopt an openness policy of its 
market to the world. Among the popular one is the partnership with the 
European Union (EU) and gaining entry into Word Trade Organization 
(WTO). The impact of privatization in Jordan is similar with other 
developing countries. The Amman Stock Exchange websites has published 
the survey on the privatization in Jordan and concluded different views for 
privatised and non-privatised agencies. The privatised firms revealed it’s 
efficient in its administrative and employment policies, its ability to earn 
higher return and better job opportunities. However, the non-privatised 
firm’s revealed its inefficiencies in administrative and employment policies, 




providing services. The Jordanian privatised plan would change the firm’s 
capital structure and board members, ownership and decision making that 
can affect the performance of the firm. Despite all the privatization efforts, 
the rise of state capitalism becomes evident due to the recent 2008 global 
financial crisis and 2011 Arab Spring. This unfortunate event has led the 
Jordanian government to bailout firms and rescue national firms from 
failure by partially own them. These firms were privatised a few years 
earlier in an intention to decrease government control over the benefit of 
countries economy. This phenomena has created “reverse privatization”, a 
new economic strategy that need to be investigated about the role of 
government ownership (Baubakri N, Ghoul E S, Guedhami O and 
Megginson WL, 2017).  
 
1.0     Background 
This paper is aimed to study the impact of government ownership on firm 
performance. In this investigation, the government ownership 
concentrations are grouped at three different levels; low, medium and high 
as well as full government ownership to measure its association with the 
firm performance.  In previous studies the relationship between capital 
structure and firm performance has been empirically analysed. The analysis 
emphasises the influence of financial variables like debt as source of finance 
compared to equity and its influence with firm performance. Past literature 
supports the notion that debt financing is proven to benefit firms in terms of 




believed to improve the firm’s financial performance (Holz, 2002).  Such an 
improvement would benefit the firm equity owners and rising in share price. 
As for job seekers it benefits them in term of decision making of 
employability like better wages and work environment and incentives. 
Using debt as a financing choice is a popular tool of managing firms in most 
privatised firms which is in line with the goal to maximise profit and 
shareholders wealth. However, a greater risk is when the debt is not utilised 
in the most optimal manner to generate revenue from the most optimal 
investment decision. This decision is perceived as the most challenging 
decision in finance. If the risk is not managed it would lead the firm to incur 
higher cost of debt compared to return and also lead to bankruptcy risks that 
eventually affect the firm performance.  
Other studies challenge the importance of government as part of the equity 
owner of the firm. In most developed and developing countries they oppose 
the influence of government ownership to bring in greater financial 
performance to the firm. While a few disregard but others agreed that firms’ 
have the ability to obtain more shares in its own firm. This study will unveil 
the importance of Jordanian government ownership on its 103 listed firms 
and its possible influence on its financial performance as proxied by ROA, 








1.1 Jordan and Other MIDA Countries 
Due to severe financial crises, Jordan and other MIDA countries 
entered into the new economic recovering process. Among all 
the MIDA countries, Jordan’s recovering process included a 
privatization package. This plan has shown significant growth of 
foreign ownership and privatization packages to influence its 
economic growth. Hence it gave a great impact on its capital 
structure and firm performance. Since the establishment of the 
Amman Stock Exchange in 1970, a drastic increase has been 
shown in the number of listed firms, trading volume and total 
market capitalization. In Jordan, privatization of public firms 
has been an on-going government program. This has been 
exercised since early nineties; an economic package to influence 
the economies. Since then the main priority of the government 
in this program is to manage its state owned listed firms. In 
some circumstances the Jordanian government engaged in 
taking over ineffective firms to support the private sectors and 
participate more in economic growth. This privatization move 
would certainly affect the capital structure and firm 
performance. Some viewed that poor management and 
inefficiency in decision making would be the main reason for 






1.2  Jordan’s Economic Performance and Political Uncertainty 
In the past, Jordan has made good economic progress in spite of 
political uncertainties in the Middle East region.  Since post war, 
Jordan has been positively preparing for economic recovery and 
gradually stimulated its weak financial market. Some of the 
recovery plans were privatization programs, stimulation the 
stock market activity, to foster better governance practice and 
international integration. As a result of positive economic move 
by the government, institutional investors’ confidence level 
increased to invest in Jordan equity market.  That's why it’s vital 
to measure the financial performance of Jordan listed firms 
during this period. Nevertheless, this investigation also can 
contribute to the growing literature of firm performance in 
association with recent government ownership in publicly 
owned firms in Jordan.  Since Jordan is one of the main 
economic contributors to the Arab region, this study also can be 
helpful in measuring how significant is the government 
ownership to impact firm’s financial performance.   
1.3  Jordan and Arab Spring 
 In 2011, the Arab Spring demonstrations led the constitutional 
monarch King  Abdallah II to dismiss the cabinet and took 
further authority of the judiciary and parliament. Since then, the 
monarchy made several constitutional amendments toward 




independent, the king retained the ultimate authority. Like any 
other Middle East countries, “wasta”, is commonly practiced in 
Jordan. Wasta refers to the network used by the families, 
business and other personal connection to advance business 
needs and personal needs. Jordan like any other Arab country 
has unique ownership structure that is mainly influenced by 
family and government ownership (Haddad et al., 2015). This 
study investigates how far government ownership can influence 
good financial decision and significantly impact the firm’s 
financial performance. 
 
1.4  Jordan Firms Characteristics  
The characteristic of Jordan firms are flexible to accept foreign 
ownership, individual ownership, institution ownership and 
government ownership. Omet, (2004) found that highly 
concentrated ownership pattern can affect firm performance. 
This study is aimed at investigating any association with 
government ownership concentration and firm financial 
performance. While some studies found highly concentrated 
ownership pattern can affect firm performance others perceived 
government ownership as negatively associated with firm 
performance (Zeitun and Tian, 2007 and Najid and Rahman, 
2011). However, it was a different scenario for UAE 




performance (Uddin et al., 2014). This anomaly has motivated 
to investigate the dynamic relationship between the firm 
financial performances driven by government ownership in 
Jordan.  
 
1.5  Theory 
The relationship between ownership method and efficiency has 
been   discussed by Adam Smith (1776). The expert raises the 
issue of joint stock ownership method that could separate the 
management from ownership. The issue raise the commitment 
of the agency relationship. It seeks managers to look after the 
business as attentive as the owner in partnership. A similar  view 
were expressed by Berle and Means (1932) when the scholars 
rekindle the separation of ownership and management control 
changed the owners role from being active to passive. 
Furthermore, shareholders need to monitor the managers (agent) 
from being self-interested. However, dispersed shareholders 
with small fraction of ownership are lack of incentives to 
exercise this role (Berle and Means 1932). Later, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) relooked the above view from Adam Smith 
(1776) and Berle and Means (1932) and tied them all as an 





An agency cost theory was emphasised by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) for the benefit of owners if more ownership stake given 
out to the agent of the firm or by incurring monitoring costs.  
However, Demsetz (1983) suggested that the principle of firm 
ownership structure is determined by the profit maximization 
motive.  Other views imply that existing and potential 
shareholders have the freedom to opt for concentrated or 
diffused ownership structure to meet optimal firm performance 
level. These views concluded that there is no systematic 
relationship between firm performance and level of firm 
ownership concentration. 
Past studies stressed that academic studies appear from a related 
selected body of knowledge or known as theory (Quinlan, 2011; 
Johnson 2014). This knowledge is expected to contribute further 
as an addition theory in that area of study. It has been regarded 
that most of the past research has been built on an existing body 
of knowledge.  Similarly, this research has been carried out 
based on the Keynesian Demand Management Theory, 
Signalling Theory and Agency Theory. 
 
1.5.1   The Keynesian Demand Management Theory 
This theory stressed that government ownership is mainly to 
stimulate economic growth, employment and better living 




inflation and unemployment is under control. The popularity and 
role of government ownership in economic development was 
vital and poorly challenged since post –war period until late 
1970s. However, both inflation and unemployment rates rose 
late in 1970’s and drove the firms to perform inefficiently in 
terms of cost control and quality of goods as demanded. 
Furthermore, managers also have no initiative to be efficient 
since government have access to unlimited public funds for 
business financing. During this time, the market forces give 
advantage to the superiority of private firms to full fill the gap to 
efficiently perform in free markets. 
 
1.5.2      Signalling Theory 
This theory has been a popular theory in finance and economics 
in relation to dividend announcement for its shareholders and 
the impact to the firm value (DaDalt et al. 2002; Allen et al. 
2003 and Brickley, 1983). However, a mixed response has been 
concluded in this relationship. In developed countries, positive 
reaction have been shown on the firm stock price after the 
announcement of dividend when compared to the Chinese 
shareholders (Le, 2011 and Su 2005). However, Su, (2005) 
reported that Chinese firms with high level of government 
ownership tend to distribute dividend to its shareholders. The 
scholar concludes that firm value and government ownership is 




dividend were not likely to produce better firm value. This 
notion is supported by Su, (2005) and suggests that dividend 
paying is signalling the firms in long run to lose out its firm 
value.  
Leland et al. (1977) studied the Signalling theory that narrates 
the association of ownership structure and firm value. Similarly, 
Signalling theory also relates the association of financial 
decision and firm value (Welch, 1996; Chemmanur et al 1997 
and Connelly et al. 2011). Past studies acknowledged that firms 
with debt component in their financial decision, provide a signal 
to the market and it is associated with firm value. In developed 
economies, debt is associated with firms’ efficiency to generate 
return and increase its share price (James, 1987 and Lummer, S. 
and McConnell, J. 1989). However, in developing economies, 
investors’ perceived debt is insignificant with firm performance. 
This is due to underdeveloped monitoring system which is 
unlikely in the developed countries. The system in developed 
countries enables to monitor the managers’ performance 
efficiency (Bear et al. 1995 and Dharwadkar et al. 2000). 
 
1.5.3  Agency Theory 
This theory defines the relationship between the owner of firms, 
the principles and the managers who are the agents who are 




(Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Robeson and O’Connor, 2013). 
Past studies when investigate the relationship between managers 
role and performance tend to relate the agency theory 
framework. This framework is expected to resolve the agency 
issues that are possible to occur and obstruct managers (BOD) to 
perform to serve in the best interest of the owner (Carter, 
Simkins and Simpson, 2003). Other researchers found that 
serious attention is needed for the managers (BOD) to perform 
effectively. Some suggested the role of board to be monitored 
then let the board to be independent in making decision, without 
the influence of politics or significant shareholders or debt 
holders (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1988, 1991; John and Senbet, 1998). Adam, (1994) suggested 
that the role of agent is important. Their effective decision 
making process is assist by their daily experience in operating 
the business. However, Lee and O’Neil, (2003) expressed that 
agency theory is more focused on the agent’s decision which is 
based on self-interest than firm interest. Such intention may 
increase agency cost to monitor agency problem and reduce 
capital investment that can benefit shareholder and the firm at 
the expense of shareholders. This theory generally explains the 
responsibility of the agents in making decision on behalf of the 
principle for the benefit of the firm and shareholders. The theory 




that decision making compliance to firm’s objective and firm’s 
financial performance.  
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
The impact of government ownership on firm performance has long been 
argued in the finance literature. However, the findings have been 
inconclusive. Furthermore other studies focus more on the managerial 
ownership and foreign ownership to influence the firm performance. Among 
the very few researches that focus onto the influence of government 
ownership on firm performance are Liao, Jing and Young Martin (2012). 
The scholars found that only in small firms’ government ownership able to 
influence its firm performance. But, (Abramov A, Radygin A, Entov R and 
Chernova M, 2017), found an inverse relationship between government 
ownership and firm performance. The study used 114 major Russian firms 
to measure performance. A similar result was found by Chan KY, Chen L 
and Wong N (2017), when its cross-sectional analysis of New Zealand firms 
provided that government owned firms is negatively associated with firm 
performance. However, their time-series analyses provided positive result. 
This could be due to improvement of performance as the firm gradually 
move into privatization.  
This study fills the gap in the existing finance literature on seeking a 
solution on how far government ownership concentration in Jordan can 
influence firms’ performance. This study use cross-sectional approach with 




variables with its six financial ratios as an independent variables; long term 
debt to total assets, age of the firm, current ratio, market to book value, 
capital expenditure and total assets.  
Past literature noted different levels of shareholders have different interest 
in the firm. Thus it drives different incentives and ability to monitor the 
firm’s activity and performance. Past literature also provided mixed result 
with regard to ownership and its concentration with firm performance 
(Douma et al. 2003; Aydin, 2007 and Najid and Rahman, 2011). This study 
seeks a solution whether the government ownership concentration in Jordan 
listed firms correlate with firm performance.   
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
Most potential investors are continuously seeking for return on investment 
at most safest level of risk. Such intention can be achieved with most 
appropriate investment decision. While most studies oppose the 
participation of government to influence positively the firm’s performance, 
a few argued the possibility of government ownership to increase the firm 
value (Najid and Rahman, 2011). Based on the earlier developed problem 
statement, the objective of the study are as below:  
This study seeks to find the relationship between government ownership and 





Research Objective: To examine the relationship between government 
ownership and firm performance. Studies in the past provide mixed results 
of the relationship between government ownership and firm performance. 
Ayud and Hegstad (1986), Haririan (1989), Wei et al., (2003) and 
Megginson et al. (2004) commented that this relationship is negatively 
correlated. However, Wei Z, Varela O, Hasan, MK and D’souza J (2003), 
reported that government ownership in privatized firms performed well 
financially and in operation. The relationship between government 
ownership and firm performance have been perceived positively in UAE 
and Malaysia (Aljifri and Moustafa , 2007 and Najid Rahman, 2011). 
 
1.3   Research Questions 
This section investigates the relationship between government ownership as 
a part of financing component (capital structure) of the firm as well as its 
significant contribution and influence to the firms’ financial performance. 
This study categorised government ownership into three groups. The first 
group represents government ownership of less than 28% common shares 
from total common shares issued, the second group indicates the 
government ownership of more than 28% but less than 50% and the third 
group representing government ownership equal more than 50%. This study 
also perform a separate analysis for government ownership with firm 




Therefore, this study aims to uncover the following research question: Is 
there a significant relationship between government ownership and firm 
performance which is measured by ROA, ROE, and EPS? 
 
1.4   Significance of the Study 
Despite many studies having been conducted on Jordan with regards to 
significance of firm ownership with firm performance, those studies only 
filled in the gap of literature in an overall context of ownership with smaller 
sample size and specific firms. Al-Shiab and Abu Tapanjeh (2005), relate 
the importance of ownership structure on 50 industrial firms’ performance 
only. Rami Zeitun and Tian (2007) investigated 59 public listed firms to 
measure which one among the three categories of investors (government, 
foreign and individual) shows poor performance. Other studies only focused 
on specific business performance like pharmaceutical (Sharabati (2010) and 
insurance industry Almajali (2012) in Jordan.   
Some studies focused on domestic corporate ownership (Claessens S, 
Djankov S, Lang LHP. 2000) and the significance of financial leverage 
(Soumadi and Hayajneh, 2012), to relate the impact to firm performance. 
This study however, focuses more on the important of government 
ownership only and its association with firm performance. It analysed larger 
samples and more industry (103 firms) unlike others in the past (less than 
100 firms).  
The importance of this study is significant for Jordan to compare its 




privatization program since it was adopted in the early nineties. The 
program allows fraction of shares to be owned by other than government at 
various fractions at all industry. The fraction of ownership offered to others 
at different percentage can impact decision making and financial 
performance. Moreover, it can also influence other investors who are 
seeking for secured investment while meeting their objective to maximise 
their return.   The study can compare how effective firms used its capital to 
increase its value. This study also can benefit the government agencies to 
view how successful and beneficial a privatization plan can be compared to 
non-privatised firms based on their financial performance as indicated by 
the commonly used financial ratio in this studies such as ROA, ROE and 
EPS.  
The significance of the study is also to test and compare performance of the 
firm since the Arab Spring in 2011. Since then, the Jordanian monarchy 
system interfered to restore economic performance and take control of many 
ill firms through their government ownership.  The study analyse cross-
sectional data of firms performance from 2011-2015. The finding of the 
study should reveal the significance of government ownership to impact 
firm financial performance in five consecutive periods of time-series. The 
result also can be used as a tool to design better economic plans that can 







1.6 Scope and Limitation of the Study 
Due to time constraint this thesis only focuses on one country, Jordan 
amongst the MIDA countries.  The study begins with 159 sample firms to 
analyse. However, due to missing financial data and outliers (too large 
values) the study ended up analysing only 103 firms. A standard source of 
information available from Bloomberg has been used. Others sources were 
not in USD currency but in Jordanian currency which needed to be 
converted at a standard rate. A standard source of data collection is to 
ensure to avoid bias information and to adopt accurate information accepted 
by all at large in order to carry out this thesis in an objective and effective 
manner. 
1.7 Organization of the Study  
In this study, the background of study is presented in section 1.1 followed 
by a problem statement in section 1.2 continued with research questions in 
section 1.3 and the research objectives in section 1.4. The significance of the 
study is presented in section 1.5 and Section 1.6 covers the scope of study. 
Chapter 2 and 3 are presented in section 2.1 and 3.1 followed by chapter 4 











The capital structure decision is one of the most important financial 
decisions in corporate finance which can influence a firm’s financial 
performance. In the past studies many scholars had expressed their concerns 
on capital structure decisions that were mostly influenced by the ownership 
concentration in making such financial decision.  While some noted the 
positive impact of ownership concentration to improve firm performance 
(Sheleifer and Vishny, 1986) others agreed it can also work in an opposite 
direction. In the long run, ownership structure and concentration become 
two important factors that can determine how healthy the firm is. This 
chapter describes the relationship of government ownership at different 
level of concentration and its association with firms’ financial performance 
ROA, ROE and EPS. The significant levels of accounting ratios associated 










2.0  Historical Review 
In competitive markets, making an appropriate capital structure decision is 
difficult when the decision is influenced by asymmetric of information and 
agency cost (Al Mutairi and Hasan, 2014). Since the seminal work of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), (MM-1958), the theory of capital structure 
and its association with firms’ value have been widely discussed in 
corporate finance and accounting literature. This theory argued that its 
restrictive assumptions such as perfect capital market, investors’ 
homogeneous expectations, tax-free economy, and no transaction costs are 
irrelevant with capital structure and firm value. In a real world application, 
these restrictive assumptions, on MM (1958), did not get much attention and 
led more researchers to introduce other rational proposition and assumption 
to proof that capital structure can affects firm’s performance. Among the 
prominent ones is Jensen and Meckling (1976). These experts empirically 
studied the agent-principal relationship and found evidence that leverage is 
positively associated with firm performance (Taub, 1975; Harris and Raviv, 
1991; Roden and Lewellen, 1995; Chanpion, 1999; Ghosh et al., 
2000;Graham and Harvey, 2001; Hadlock and James, 2002 and  Brav et al., 
2005). Another related study of agency cost by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
also found that firm performance is strongly linked with agency cost. The 
findings associate with the importance of the owner to minimise the 
monitoring costs in order to increase the firm value. The outcome of the 
analysis suggested the managers are more firm focused rather than personal 




managers incentive to maximise own benefit but shareholders wealth (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983).  
In a multinational level studies, Pedersen and Thompson, (1997) observed 
that the international firms face more financial risk compared to domestic 
firms. This is due to its weak geographical location, different tax 
requirements and legislation, poor industrial development and cultural 
differences which can affect its ownership structure and firm’s financial 
performance. 
 
2.1  Conflicting Results of Ownership and Firm Performance 
The empirical studies of the association between firm financial 
performance and ownership concentration and structure have 
produced mixed results.  
2.1.1       Negative Results 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found ownership concentration gives no 
effect to its accounting profits.  A similar results also found using 
Tobin’s Q (McConnell and Servaes (1990). Leech and Leahy (1991) 
found a negative result but significant relationship between firm’s 
profitability and ownership concentration. 
2.1.2   Positive Results  
McConnell and Servaes (1990) noted that their corporate ownership 




firm performance. Similar results also found when state ownership 
and firm value is positively associated (Tian and Estrin, 2005).  
 
2.2 Foreign ownership 
The importance of foreign ownership and its link to add firm value has 
been discussed widely in developed and developing countries. A study 
by Huang and Shiu, (2009) relate the importance of foreign ownership 
and its influence in research and development expense that can give 
positive impact to the firm performance. In international business, 
foreign ownership is internationally perceived as an advantage in 
bringing in the technology, research and development and managerial 
skills into local country that drive their investment to generate 
superior return rather than the locally owned firm (Ferreira and Matos, 
2008). A similar view has been obtained in the South Asian firms that 
foreign owned firms tend to perform greater than locally owned 
(Chhiber and Majumdar, 1999).  
According to the agency theory, firm performance and large foreign 
ownership in capital structure are positively correlated. (Eisenhardt, 
1989) noted that agency theory arises when the agent’s interest 
conflict with principle’s interest. This poor relationship can become 
worse if the principle is unable to verify the agent’s actual task. 
Furthermore, in a weak work structure it can allow freedom to the 




is also concerned with the managers’ poor performance that is related 
with decreasing stock price that led the firm into hostile takeover.  
The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance 
can be different around the world and also can produce significantly 
different results. In Korea, investigation on its firms using firms 
accounting data revealed that the most of the foreign owned firm have 
better corporate governance mechanisms that drive the firm to earned 
superior returns compared to locally owned firms (Lee, 2008). 
Shareholders support this action as an indirect threat for weak 
managers to work hard for the interest of the firm then for their 
personal interest.  
 
2.3 Government ownership 
Most of the past literatures tend to focus on the commercial nature of 
firm ownership to affect firm value compared to the social nature of 
government ownership to influence better firm value. This study and 
other following studies provide empirical evidence of the role of 
government to impact its firms’ performance positively and 
negatively. In some previous research, government ownership have 
been perceived as inefficient and ineffective (Ayud and Hegstad, 
1986; Haririan, 1989; Wei et al., 2003 and Megginson et al., 2004). 
Studies conducted on newly privatised firms in China have been 




et al. (2003). However, this paper unveils the influence of Jordan 
Government ownership on its firm’s financial performance. 
Government ownership is linked with increasing firm’s value due to 
its ability to take high risk. These high risk firms are politically 
connected and view to govern the country’s economic (Nkano and 
Nguyen, 2012) in an on-going competitive market environment. 
Furthermore, its position in influencing firm’s decision making in 
social, political and economic interest also become a determining 
factor to firm performance (John et al., 2008; Boubakri et al., 2013a 
and Uddin, 2014). 
Generally government plays a vital role in a countries social, political 
and economic growth. The social role and responsibility of a 
government can be achieved by maintaining its ownership in 
strategically related firms (Mattin, 2009; Boubakri et al., 2009). The 
economic role and responsibility such as revenue earning from taxes 
and contribute to build better capital market and infrastructure for the 
nation also can be achieved by maintaining ownership in corporate 
firms. (Uddin, 2016) reported that the government can meet its 
political, social and economic objectives by holding ownership in 
corporate firms while influence its corporate decision making. In the 
long run the government will commit to support the firm’s operation 
as long as the firm supports government motives. 
Various studies of government failures and market failures have been 




2015 and Abramov et. al, 2017) and others empirically suggest the 
privately owned firms perform better than government owned firms. 
These findings are consistent with Borcherding et al, (1982), when 40 
out of 50 empirical research papers revealed privately owned firms 
were more efficient.  
It has been noted in many theoretical articles that government 
ownership is a poor driver to influence firm’s financial performance. 
Other studies claimed that privately owned firms are more efficient 
and more profitable (Megginson & Netter, 2001) compared to firms 
owned by government. These firms are generally perceived as lack of 
expertise to operate the firm. In some cases the managers are highly 
politically motivated than commercially motivated which lead the firm 
to perform poorly (Najid and Abdul Rahman, 2011). For example an 
investigation on Singapore owned firms by (Mak and Li, 2001) 
reported the government is less active and poorly accountable in 
monitoring its investment and financial performance. Nevertheless, 
these firms’ have greater ability to get financing facilities compared to 
privately owned firms.  
However, capital structure with government ownership does provide 
benefits. It was noted that if a firm’s capital structure dominated by 
government ownership it can monitor the managers closely and 
effectively beside reduce the agency costs and can therefore increase 
the profit (Bos, 1991). Furthermore, the advantage to comply with 




provides freedom to select the suitable accounting policies that can 
improve firms’ financial performance (ALjifri and Moustafa, 2007).  
The level of government ownership signifies power and decision 
making is subjective in nature. Previous authors designate the 
ownership percentage at a given threshold to signify their voting rights 
and control (La Porta, 1999, p.476; Bortolotti and Faccio (2009), 
Megginson et. al., 2017). Some argued government can be ultimate 
ownership or direct owner and need not be 100% owner in form of 
stock to gain controlling power.  The cost-benefit of being in ultimate 
ownership has been investigated with mix result. Some argued the 
disadvantage of government direct ownership to cause poor earnings 
quality and performance and investment efficiency (Boubakri et al., 
2005; Guedhami et al., 2009; Ben-Nasr et al., 2012; Jaslowitzer et al., 
2016 and Chen et al., 2017a). Nevertheless it also provide positive 
values to the firms when come to soft budget constraint and possibility 
of bailing out during distress (Beuselinck et al., 2017). 
Government ownership can address issues referring to information 
asymmetry for investors (Shapiro and Willig, 1993). Furthermore, 
Jensen and Meckling (1979) reported government ownership can also 
help to align the conflict of interest between managers and owners. 
While, Chan KKY et al., (2016) address the importance of 
government ownership to overcome poor quality of service. Generally 
government has information advantage from various sources of 
government and non-government agencies (Eng & Mak, 2003) aim to 




According to resource dependency theory and agency theory; 
government ownership and firm performance are positively correlated. 
These relationship had been observed in United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
and Malaysia when Aljifri and Moustafa (2007) and Najid and 
Rahman (2011) found government ownership can significantly 
contribute to firms’ financial performance. In Singapore, the 
Government linked firm provide greater firm value as well as better 
corporate governance practice compared with non-government –
linked firms.  
In others studies it has been debated and focused on the importance of 
government ownership to influence firm performance (Chan KKY, 
Chen L and Wong W, 2017)). Some proposed theory with framework 
noted that the superiority of government ownership over private 
ownership in the area of public goods and issues link with career 
disparity (Besly & Ghatak, 2001, 2003, 2005; and Acemoglu et al., 
2007). Evidence from US electric utilities by Kwoka (2005), reported 
that government ownership perceived to be poor in delivering quality 
and efficient work compared to privately own. However, the user-
oriented services are delivered in much lower cost compare with 
privately own firms.  
Furthermore, Rijkers, Freund and Nucifora (2016) followed up the 
relationship between political connection and performance of large 
listed firms in Tunisia. The authors noted that large publicly listed 
firms are politically connected. They stressed further that government 




Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; Ferguson et al., 2008) is positively 
correlated to generate superior returns. Similarly, government in 
transition economy is found to be positively correlated with firm 
performance (Anderson, Lee and Murrell, 2000 and Gupta, Ham and 
Svejnar, 2001). 
 
2.4  The Advantage and Disadvantage of Government Ownership 
Based on the past literature on the advantages and disadvantage of 
government ownership have been widely discussed within the similar 
view. The disadvantages are referring to government and its 
conflicting and unclear objectives, lack of incentives for managers and 
weak in monitoring managers and poor financial and non-financial 
performance. The advantages are mostly linked with government’s 
benefit in providing the gap when a firm is facing soft budget 
constraint; the state government investors efficiently monitor the 
firm’s decision making and control while provide financial support to 
bailout when in financial distress.  
Over the last decade, government ownership in public listed firms’ 
have been observed as bringing in economy beneficial through their 
state capitalism program, nationalization program and bailout 
program. Borisova et al., (2012, 2015) noted that governments 
continue to be influential in ownership and control while providing 
several benefits to the firm. Among the significant one is the bailout 




et al. (2006) supported this notion that the higher the degree of 
political connectedness the greater the degree to be bailed-out and 
lower the cost of equity to finance the capital, (Boubakri et al. 2012).   
It has been reported in Thailand that politically connected firms with 
bank connection will benefit in getting more long term loan with 
minimum collateral requirements. The firm also benefits from being 
competed by others when added status like national level privilege 
provided against its competitors. 
The divestiture of government ownership in public listed firms has 
been reported to bring greater performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1994; Megginson et al.,; Boubakri et al., 2005). Others provided 
evidence that in increasing cost of equity in government ownership 
firms (Ben-Nasr et al., (2012). Poor quality of financial reporting and 
poor governance quality has been associated with government 
ownership (Guedhami et al., 2009; Borisova et al., 2012). Baubakri et 
al., (2017) reported that generally government owned firms have 
better market valuation compared to non-government owned. The 
scholars also found the significant influence of government to 
positively affect the value of firms even in non-government owned 
firms. This result relate with the ability of government owned firm to 
finance at an attractive discount rate that influence investors in cash 
valuation as opposed to managers view to value the firm from 
investing decision view. 
The association between government ownership and firm’ market 




degree of corruption. If a country had lower corruption rate and 
showed greater degree of rule of law the firm is supposed to establish 
higher value with the association of government ownership (Baubakri 
et al 2017). A similar finding can be perceived in a country with stable 
government that poses effectiveness quality and bureaucratic quality. 
A few empirical studies concluded that government ownership is 
closely linked with poor investment efficiency (Jaslowitzer et al. 
2016; Chen et al. 2017b). 
An inverse relationship found that when the government ownership 
becomes greater than 50% the firm value declined (Baubakri et al 
2017). This result is consistent with past studies that significant 
decline in revenue of post- privatized firms were unable to benefit 
from privatization when government is still in control of ownership.  
In Finance financial variables like profitability is an important 
variables to reveal a firm performance. There has been less research 
on the association of government ownership and firm performance in 
emerging markets generally, in Jordan particularly. Most of the 
empirical literature of government ownership on public listed firms 
and its firm performance were mostly conducted for developed 
markets. (Claessens et al., 2000; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001 and 
Boubakri et al., 2013a), nevertheless it is also popular in other 
developing country including Jordan. Several studies in developing 
countries like Kuwait, Turkey, China, India Singapore, Malaysia and 
Jordan concluded that the participation of government ownership is 




Gursory and Aydogan, 2002; Gupta , 2005; And and Ding, 2006; 
Zeitun and Tian, 2007; Tian and Estrin. 2008 Najid and Rahman, 
2011; Al Mutairi and Hasan, 2014 ).  
 
2.5   Developed Country Market Studies 
In the past literature much has been argued on how significant is the 
relationship between firm performance and ownership concentration 
in the US market. Among the prominent ones are Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1988) analysed 371 firms and Wruck (1989) analysed 128 
firms.  Both studies suggested the empirical relationship between 
ownership and firm value is a non-linear form but rather a curvilinear 
one. Similar non-linearity findings were also found in other studies in 
US (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Welsbach, 1991; 
Holderness et al, 1999). Other studies on ownership were based on 
conflict of interest between shareholders and managers. However, 
Omran et al, (2008) concluded that in most developing countries 
ownership is mostly concentrated in major shareholders who are small 
in number like individuals, institutions and government agencies.   
The importance of ROA as determining factor of firm performance 
has been used in various economic sectors. Like Pasiouras and 
Kosmidou (2007), also used ROA to research factors that can 
influence profitability of local and foreign commercial banks. They 





Liu and Wilson (2010), investigated the Japanese bank performance 
using ROA and ROE as the dependent variable. Unlike other studies, 
the explanatory variable like GDP was used as an important variable 
to determine the Japanese banks performance following the 1990’s 
financial crisis.  
The use of GDP to determine firm performance was also used by 
Messai et al., (2015) in a panel data of 322 banks from 15 western 
Europe countries from 2007-2011. The scholar concluded that GDP 
can influence ROA.  
In Switzerland, Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011) analysed 372 
commercial banks profitability from 1999-2009. They concluded that 
firms’ ownership can affect ROA. In China, Zhang and Daly provide 
evidence that macroeconomic variables are directly linked with ROA 
of banks. Recently El-Ansary O, and Megahed M (2016) examined 
banks performance using ROA as performance measurement conclude 
that spending on noninterest items can influence profitability 
performance.   
Saeed M Sajid, (2014) used 73 samples of United Kingdom banks 
data  from 2006 -2012 to investigate the relationship of dependent 
variable as ROA and macroeconomic factors with independent value 
of bank financial  like size, liquidity, leverage. The regression analysis 
and Housman test concluded that independent value positively affects 




Debt financing has been positively reported to influence firm 
performance. Wippern (1966) examined the association of financial 
leverage and firm performance of different industries in growth, cost 
and demand. The study examined financial leverage debt ratio and 
earnings to market value of equity to measure firm performance. The 
result concluded that financial leverage is positively associated with 
firm performance. Similarly, Kinsman and Newman (1999) noted that 
the relationship between choice of capital structure and firm’s 
performance is important in determining the impact of debt level on 
firm’s performance.  Holz (2002) also tested capital structures with 
debt ratio financing firms were found to be positively correlated with 
firm performance.  Desi and Robertson (2003), proved that financial 
leverage positively affect the firm performance. The result explained 
that low growth firms seek borrowing facility for growth opportunity 
and intend to increase its firm’s performance. This paper also uses the 
similar approach that government ownership is an independent 
variable to explain the firm financial performance using ROA, ROE 
and EPS as dependent variable taking into account time-series of five 
period of heterogeneity of firms. 
The relationship between insider ownership and firm performance has 
been studied in the context of Western countries. Among them were, 
Bohren and Odegaard, (2001) who found insider ownership is 
positively contributing to firm performances. Similar studies in 
Germany by Kaserer and Moldenhauer (2008) reported all the 648 




performance. These findings are in line with the theory of agency cost 
when insider ownership can improve firm performance if agency cost 
decreases, provided that the resources are aimed to focus to maximise 
firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). However, Hu and Izumida, (2008) 
reported that the optimal level of insider ownership was dependent on 
the firm performance and other variables like firm size, investor 
protection level and industry.  
 
2.6 Developing Countries Market Studies 
In Philippines, the ROA performance was influenced by both financial 
and nonfinancial variables, (Sufian and Chong, 2008). Similar study 
also examined the performance of ROA of Malaysian banks from 
2000 to 2004, it concluded that Non Interest Expense ratio of financial 
variable and inflation of economic variables were positively correlated 
with ROA. In another study using Korean banks financial and 
economic data from 1992-2003 provide a similar evidence that lower 
liquidity ratio and inflation are positively correlated with ROA, as the 
firm performance indicator. 
Meanwhile, Davydenko (2010) investigation of Ukraine banks used 
panel data with the support of fixed and random effect models found 
that ROA is determined by exchange rate depreciation despite of low 




In India, Majumdar and Chhibber (1999) investigated Indian firms 
debt level in their capital structure is negatively correlated with firm 
performance. Following the studies on 1005 Indian firms by Douma S, 
George R and Kabir R, (2006) on average, Indian firms with foreign 
ownership, only accounted a small percentage of the total shares of 
Indian listed firms. However, based on the daily stock turnover these 
firms account large liquidity on the stock exchange and perceived as 
significant drivers of market sentiment (Banaji, 2000).   
Chiang et al. (2002) examined Hong Kong property and construction 
sectors capital structure and firm performance showed that firms 
highly levered firm is negatively associated with firm performance.  
In Ghana, Abor (2005) reported that the leverage of public listed firms 
give mix result of relation with firm performance. The study 
concluded that Short term debt and total debt are positively associated 
with firm’s profitability ratio like ROE unlike the long term debt. 
 
2.7  Middle Eastern Countries 
Investigation on sub-Saharan African firms by Kyereboah-Coleman 
(2007) revealed firms’ with high leverage can influence the 
performance of ROA and ROE. The investigation was done on 
microfinance institutions and its relationship with capital structure.  
In Tunisia, ten Tunisian commercial banks from 1980-2000 were 




Housman Test. The result concluded banks overhead to assets ratio 
variable gave significant influence to income.  
In Turkey, Gurbuz abd Aybars, (2011) reported that the sample 
studies on non-financial firms performed better in return on assets and 
operating profit in minority foreign ownership.  
Similar finding found in 80 Kuwait listed firms that the nine years 
data analysis of government ownership is not insignificant with firm’s 
financial performance (ROA).  The tested pooled data provide similar 
result with panel regression using the random effect (Al Mutairi and 
Hasan, 2004). Other studies in Kuwait reported (Al Mutairi and 
Hasan, 2014) that the Kuwait capital market is inefficient compared 
with other emerging markets. The pooled data relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance is a non-linearity. It 
signifies that government ownership is positively related with Tobin’s 
Q. It also implies that an increase in government ownership above 
required point of studies, as the firm performance decreases. 
 
2.8  Other papers on Jordan Market 
Al-Shiab and Abu Tapanjeh (2005), examined the relationship of 
ownership structure and firm performance of 50 Jordanian Industrial 
firms listed on Amman Stock Exchange from 1996-2002. The 
ordinary least square suggested that the firm performance is 
significant to changes on the firm’s ownership when capital structure, 




the study revealed a non-linear and significant effect of firm 
ownership toward market-based shareholders value but was 
insignificant toward ROA.  
Rami Zeitun and Gary Gang Tian (2007), investigated the influence of 
firm’s ownership structure owned by government, companies and 
individuals on firm’s performance and the firms default risk. The 
studies used a sample of 59 public listed companies in Jordan from 
1989-2002. The study generally concluded that government ownership 
is related with ROE and EPS of firms’ financial performance. 
However, among the three categories of ownerships, low government 
ownership was negatively related with EPS but ROE is positively 
related with all government ownership. The study also uses defaulted 
firms as variables of ownership measurement to predict firm 
performance. The result shows that defaulted firms with highly 
concentrated government ownership are negatively correlated with 
firm performance compared to foreign ownership. 
Sharabati (2010), empirically tested the relationship between 
intellectual capital and business performance of pharmaceutical 
industry in Jordan. The result shows that these firms effectively 
manage their intellectual capital that positively influences the business 
performance. 
Almajali (2012) also analysed Jordan Insurance firms’ financial 
performance from 2002-2007. The sample study was taken from 25 




analysed financial variables like leverage, liquidity, and size and 
management competence index using multiple regression method are 
positively related with financial performance. It further reported that 
the size of the firms can significantly affect the firms’ performance in 
highly competitive markets. The impact of leverage is positively 
significant with firm’s financial performance. The author also 
commented that highly levered firms are at risk of bankruptcy due to 
default payment. However, levered firms yield better ROI with tax 
shield.   
Abuzayed (2012), investigated the influence of working capital 
management on firm’s profitability and firm’s value. The study used 
panel data analysis to estimate the fixed and random effects, and 
generalized methods of moments on Amman-Jordan listed firms from 
2000-2008. This robust technique revealed that profitability is 
positively correlated with cash conversion cycle. 
Soumadi and Hayajneh (2012), examined the impact of capital 
structure on Jordanian firms performance listed in Amman Stock 
Exchange. The study empirically analysed 76 firms from 2001-2006 
using multiple regression model that concluded the firms’ capital 
structure was negatively associated with firms performance. The 
evidence shows that firms with different leverage level having no 
significant differences on firms. The result also revealed that there 
was no relationship found between financial leverage of high growth 




Among the different type of firm ownership, domestic ownership type 
has been perceived as a way to take other minority shareholders 
wealth, Douma et al. (2006). Claessens et al., (2000) reported that 
domestic corporations in emerging market are the largest block-
holders group. In Jordan-Amman, listed firms constitute the largest 
category of shareholders. Allen and Phillips (2000), provide evidence 
that domestic corporate ownership positively correlate with firm 
value. In some cases a significant benefit is observed when engage in 
reducing cost of monitoring the ventures between firms and their 
block holders. 
A phenomenon in corporate capital structure that firm performance is 
influenced by government ownership has been proven mostly in 
developing capital market like China, Singapore and Malaysia. Lately, 
such studies had gained popularity in emerging market region like 
Jordan. This study is contributing to the literature on the relationship 
between government ownership concentration and firm performance.  
The present study fills in the literature on the influence of capital 
structure on firm’s performance. The empirical evidence shows firms 
capital structure can explain its financial performance taking into 







2.9  How to Measure Firm Performance 
Past literature suggest accounting –based and market –based (Tobin-
Q) measures as a choice to measure firm performance. Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) choose the accounting base to measure firm performance 
while Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) used both measures to determine firm performance. 
Most of the past research like McConnel and Servaes (1990), 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Loderer and Marin (1997), Cho 
(1998), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), and Holderness, 
Kroszner, Sheehan (1999) prefer to use Tobin’s Q to investigate firm 
performance. 
Some of the common weakness of accounting base is subject to 
accounting standards compared to market base that account for market 
value for growth purpose. Furthermore, accounting profit is based on 















This chapter serves the purpose to indulge further on research methodology. 
Bickman and Rog (1998) emphasised the importance of making the suitable 
approach and procedures with the intention to improve the validity of the 
result found from the study.  
This thesis is aimed to investigate the relationship between the government 
ownership and firm performance. Furthermore, the study examines the 
impact of government ownership in different intervals as specified earlier in 
Chapter One, as well as full government ownership in the firms’ capital 
structure that influences the decision making process and its influence on 
firm performance. 
 
3.0  Conceptual Framework 
This study choose the quantitative approach in developing its conceptual   
framework, hypothesis, data collection and analysis techniques (Mat Rabi et 
al. 2010; Zhao, 2013 and Zhang et al., 2014). The collection of raw data 
from Bloomberg source coupled with individual firm’s financial report 
which is available on its website has to be processed and analysed to turn 





The conceptual framework of this study comprise of three variables as 
follows: The firm performance as the dependent variable using three 
different measures (run by three separate models) which are Return on Asset 
(ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) and Earnings Per Share (EPS); the 
independent variable is government ownership which is reclassified in two 
group of testing. The first group test government ownership in total and the 
second government ownership sub group into 3 levels, less than 28%, equal 
and more than equal 28 but less than 50% and equal and more than 50% 
accordingly to research papers by Chhibber and Majumdar (1998) and 
Baubakri, Ghoul, Guedhami and Megginson (2017); the control variables 
are long term debt to total assets, current ratio, total assets, market to book 
value capital expenditures and age. The conceptual framework 
operationalization is shown in Figure 3.1 and its description for the above 
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Table 3.1  
Variable Definitions, Abbreviations and Data Sources 




ROA Test firms’ profitability relative 
to its total assets in percentage. 
Measures the firm’s efficiency to 
manage its assets to generate 
earnings. 
 
Net Income / Average 






ROE Return on equity invested by 
common shareholders. 







Basic Earnings per share exclude 
dilution of equities and 
convertibles.  
Net Income after tax 
and preference 
dividend / number of 





 Full data without subgroups (i.e. 
Low, Medium and High)  
Percentage of equity 






<28% Low Government Ownership  
Less than 28%. 








Medium Government Ownership  
Gov_Own equal and more than 
28%-50%.  









High Government Ownership 
Gov_ Own equal and more than 
50%.  







Capex Additional assets invested during 
a year 
Total value of capital 






Age The longer the duration in 
operation the easier it is to obtain 
external fund.  
Different of observed 
year and established 
year 
Bloomberg 
Current Ratio CR Liquidity ratio: Current assets 
ratio to current liabilities 
Current assets : 
current liabilities 
Bloomberg 
Price to Book 
Ratio 
MTBV To compare firm’s current 
market price to its book value 
Market 
capitalization/Total 








Leverage ratio: Total long term 
debt divided by Total assets in 
percentage. 
Total long term debt / 
by Total Assets * 100 
Bloomberg 
Total assets TA Total of current assets and Fixed 
assets  









3.1  Dependent Variables 
This study uses the historical accounting-based figures as tool of 
measurement to investigate firms’ financial performance. The three 
measurement tools are return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) 
and earnings per share (EPS). The sample data in this study exclude 
financial institutions like bank, investment and insurance company 
since its operating characteristics, business model, capital structure, 
and also their regulatory environment are significantly different from 
typical non-financial firms in order to evaluate the firms’ performance 
(Barr et al., 2002). With regard to banks and financial institution, the 
relationship between firm performance and foreign ownership capital 
structure provide mix results and not consistent with non-financial 
industry. 
 
3.1.1  Return on Assets (ROA) 
This study uses ROA to measure firm performance. The definition of 
ROA is in line with other similar studies as the operating earnings 
before interest, depreciation, and taxes over the book value of total 
assets (Baubakri et al., 2017).  Douma (2006), applied ROA for firm 
performance measurement. Other studies have reported profitability is 
positively related with firm performance (Magaritis and Psillaki, 
2010). This study uses ROA as dependent value to measure firms’ 
financial performance (Alfredo et al., 2010 and Giovanna and Cassia, 




the operating earnings before interest, depreciation, and taxes over the 
book value of total assets is used as accounting-based measure.  
Douma  (2006) applied ROA as measurement for firm performance. 
Furthermore, Core et al, (2006) noted that ROA is more desired proxy 
since it is not affected by leverage to evaluate firm performance. In 
addition, ROA is more preferred as distributional properties than ROE 
to examine firm performance and corporate governance (see Rose, 
2007; Chtristensen et al., 2010 and Ibrahim & Samad, 2011).  
 
3.1.2 Return on Equity (ROE)  
This study uses ROE as dependent value to measure firms’ financial 
performance. It is defined as ratio earnings before interest, taxes and 
depreciation divided by the book value of the firm’s total equity. 
Similar with Bharadwaj (2000), Dedrick, Gurbaxani and Kraemer 
(2003) and Hatem, (2014), this paper also measures firm performance 
by the net income over equity ratio. Other studies empirically found 
ROE is significantly related with firm performance (Ang and Ding, 
2005; Wu, 2011 and Baubakri et al., 2017). Thomsen and Pedersen 








3.1.3  Earnings Per Share (EPS) 
This study also uses basic earnings per share, (EPS). It is measured as 
net income or loss after deducting taxes and preference share dividend 
accruing to equity-holders per number of outstanding shares. Basic in 
this context refers to exclusion change of number of shares 
outstanding during the reporting year such as dilution of equities due 
to convertible bonds and stock options. Graham et al., (2005) 
surveyed 400 financial executives in the US and reported EPS as far 
most important performance measures. Furthermore, the positive 
growth of EPS result is linked with compensation for managers and 
firm’s performance. Generally, EPS is also used as pre-requisite for 
strategic decision-making for share valuation, as incentives scheme 
for management performance and merger and acquisition. Similarly 
Hatem, (2014) also used it for firm performance. 
 
3.2 Independent Variables 
The global financial crisis in 2008 and the impact of Arab spring in 
2011 drove the Jordanian government to own more shares on 
previously privatised firms as a bailout strategy. This study examined 
the influence of government ownership at two levels. First it test all 
government ownership of equity in percentage for each firms. Then it 
test again government ownership at less than 28%, equal and more 
than 28% - less than 50% and equal and more than 50%. The 




government ownership. The data obtain on shareholding report the 
percentage of government own percentage shares in each firm from 
Bloomberg. These information allow to classify firms in three 
different levels of government ownership.  Prior studies examined the 
relationship between ownership and firm performance (Chhibber and 
Majumdar, 1998; Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998; Thomsen and 
Pedersen, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 2000b; Douma et. al.,2006 and 
Baubakri et al., 2017).  
 
3.2.1      Government ownership variables  
This study uses government ownership variables as the most 
important explanatory variables. Government ownership (GO) is 
indicating government ownership in Percentage.  Since the purpose of 
this study is to measure how significant is the contribution of 
government ownership to firm performance, the government 
ownership become the main focus and its variables examined by two 
levels of analyses, firstly, government ownership without any 
subdivision and another by subdividing them into three category of 
government ownership i.e., low, medium and high. This category will 
then subdivide the government ownership equity as low or small 
ownership if less than 28%, government ownership equal and above 
28% but less than 50% is categorised as medium ownership and 
government ownership equal and more than 51% as high or large 




in percentage of common shares held by government in all listed firms 
and identify them as GO low, GO medium and GO high. 
This paper empirically analyses the ownership structure as foreign 
ownership labelled as FOREIGN ownership, though these account for 
a small percentage of the total shares of Jordan-Amman Stock 
exchange together with local ownership as percentage of common 
shares owned on shares issued. In this study, local ownership is 
representing local individuals who own large stake in the firm and 
local institutions. They are identified as LOCAL_ownership. A 
common practice has been observed in MENA countries where 
wealthy individuals own large amounts of shares in most of the listed 
firms with controlling stake percentage. A part of these shares will be 
given out to government and foreign investors. In some cases none 
given out to others but mostly to the government. This study 
empirically providing evidence that Local Ownership is insignificant 
driver to firm performance without government ownership. Unlike 
other MENA countries, Jordan has given out most of the equity to 
Local individuals and foreign ownership. Jordan has participated to 
privatise its government agency in line with the demand to liberalise 








3.2.2    Control variables 
Earlier studies in this area were mostly based on case studies or on a 
simple nonparametric, comparison of the performance of private 
versus government without controlling for other influencing factors 
(Chibber and Majumdar, 1998). Furthermore, the performance 
analysis in the past papers also found to be industry level making the 
analysis privately owned firms are better performer.  
This study is taking the view suggested by Chibber and Majumdar 
(1989) that the concept of ownership is principally perceived to be a 
firm-level and not an industry level. This study did not control for 
industry level but provide an option of analysis taking into account the 
control for year effect. This study controls variety of financial 
variables of industry and environment factors. It suggest six 
accounting variables that can influence firms’ financial performance 
positively or negatively. This influence is also predicting the firm’s 
ability to generate above average levels of performance. Due to lack 
of theory or standard model to support the differences in firm 
performance, a wide set of accounting variables have been suggested 
as vital influencing tool for firm performance. This variables covers in 
differentiating firms level of leverage, size, investment, value, 








Past literature suggested that age of a firm is an important determining 
factor of firm performance (Morck et al. 1988). This study measure 
the age of a firm by the number of years the firm has been in operation 
since founded. Some previous findings reported negatively the 
relationship of age and firm performance (Langberg, 1983 and Chen-
Hui Wu, 2013). However, this empirical study argue the fact that older 
age carries along a good reputation thus positively affect the firm 
performance. Shapiro (1982), reviewed the study on role of 
multinational firms in Canada and stressed that age is an important 
explanatory variables to overcome a poorly presented models with 
low R Square rather than rely on economic variables.  It is also noted 
that a poorly presented models linked with poor explanatory variables 
that can show empirically low R Square due to variables like age left 
out instead of economic variables. While some theories and its 
statistical evidence suggest age of business does not matter to measure 
firm performance but other empirical findings are positively 









3.2.4  Capital Expenditures 
This study computes capital expenditure as total value of additional 
assets invested in dollar amount for each financial year.  A similar role 
of capital expenditure was also applied by Phung and Le (2013) when 
empirically computing the relationship of foreign ownership and firm 
performance of listed Vietnamese firms from 2008-2011. Several 
studies computed capital investment expenditures as ratio to sales or 
total assets. Regardless of the approach used, the purpose to increase 
efficiency of the firm is to generate revenue. 
 
3.2.5 Market-to-book ratio 
The value of government ownership has been investigated in the full 
accounting period from 2011-2015. The firm value is measured by the 
market to book ratio similar to previous approach applied by Claesens 
et al., (2002) and Kalcheva and Lins, (2007). It is computed as the 
sum of the market value of equity at the year end and the book value 
of debt, divided by total assets in book value. This computation 
indicates the market value of equity as the market capitalization value 
at year end (Claessens et al. 2002; Lins, 2003). This ratio have been 
widely used in an empirical manner due to its ability to measure firm 
value (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Palich et al. 2000). However, 
some studies comment that the ability and the significance of MTBV 
to correlate with ROA and ROE. Al-Shiab (2005) suggested that 




performance with greater firm information. This study uses MTBV as 
the independent variable to measure its association with firm 
performance.   
 
3.2.6 Liquidity (Current Ratio) 
Cho (1998), established the importance of liquidity and its relationship 
with firm performance. Among the liquidity ratios is the current ratio 
of firms that acknowledge liquidity position by measuring the ratio of 
current assets to current liabilities for each period. Khamis, (2015), 
adopted liquidity ratio to measure performance of Bahraini listed 
firms. The study analysed a sample size of 42 Bahraini firms from 
2007-2011. The descriptive analysis mean and standard deviation 
reported as 9% and 12% respectively. This study argues the 
significance of current ratio as independent variable to influence firm 
performance proxy by ROA, ROE and EPS.  
 
3.2.7     Total asset 
Firm size is commonly known to affect a firm’s performance in many 
ways. Generally, large firm are known for their unique characteristics 
such as diverse capabilities, exploitation of economies of scale, and 
the adoption of formal procedures. These features allow large firms to 




greater returns (ROA). However, large firms can be less efficient than 
smaller firms.  
Past studies establish the notion that firm size can influence firm 
performance (Ramaswamy, 2001; Frank and Goyal, 2003). The larger 
the firm size the greater the opportunity for the firms to grow 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996 and Klapper and Love, 2004). This 
paper consider Total Assets, which is (in thousands of USD) to 
compute and measure firm size. Previous studies have concluded that 
firm size is positively correlated with firm performance. Tian and 
Zeitun, (2007) and Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) provide empirical 
evidence that firm size has positive and significant impact on firm 
performance. However, Studies by Jiraporn and Liu, (2008) and King 
and Santor, (2008) used Tobin’s Q technique that indicates firm size is 
negatively correlated with firm performance. Similarly, Brian et al., 
(2014) reported large firm size can cause conflict of interest between 
owners and managers. This conflict can affect the firm to perform 
negatively. The controlling for size effect is in line with the result in 
Fama and French (1995). The study concluded that small firms on 
average earn lower compared to large firms based on book value to 
equity. Furthermore, large firms are able to utilise economics of scale 
compared to small firms. This study use total asset value as control of 
size variable. This approach is similar to studies like Morck et al. 
(1989) and McConnel and Servaes, (1990) compared to Xu and Wang 





3.2.8 Leverage (Long Term Debt to Total Assets) 
Since leverage influences firm performances (Mashayekhi and Bazaz, 
2008), this study measure it as long term debt to total asset. Leverage 
has been propounded to give positive and negative effect on firm 
performance (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984; and Jensen, 
1986). Many studies supported the influence of leverage on firm’s 
financial performance (Admms and Buckle, 2000; Neri, 2001; Bashir, 
2005; Liarhavas and Skandalis, 2008; Nimalathasan and Valeriu 
Brabete, 2010) while a few opposed its strength to impact firm 
performance (Ibrahim El-Sayed, 2009; Abdul 2012; Mahfuzah and 
Yadav, 2012). Leverage is propound to measure how much the firm 
relies on debt to finance its fixed assets (Guedhami et al., 2009 and 
Manish, 2017). On the other hand, Frank and Goyal, (2009), indicated 
that the above measurement is possible if debt is valued as book value 
or market value against the total assets. Khamis et al., (2015), used the 
ratio total debt to total assets as leverage to determine its impact to 
Bahraini listed firms’ performance. This ratio provides a mean of 41% 
with 29% standard deviation.  
Leverage is also propounded to be positively correlated with firm size 
as in sales. Past research linked the relationship of debt and 
bankruptcy based on the firm size. It suggests that large firms are less 
likely to be in bankruptcy risk due to its greater debt capacity 
compared to small firms (Rajan and Zingales, 1995 and Titman and 
Wessel, 1998). Similarly, this study also argues that the significance 




This analysis assumed all MIDA countries have similar business 
characteristics.  
Zeitun (2007), used long term debt to total assets as an independent 
variable to examine the relationship of ownership structure and firm 
performance in Jordan using 59 samples of listed firms from 1989-
2002. The regression analysis for this ratio is negatively associated 
with ROA and ROE as to measure firm performance.  
Boubakri et al., (2017) investigated the effect of government 
ownership on market value of public listed firms in East Asia. The 
robust evidence suggested government owned firms’ market values 
are greater than non-government owned firms. The leverage ratio, 
long term debt to total assets, that has been used in this study as 
control variable are significantly related with firm performance. As 
reported in the previous literature, government owned firms’ have 
greater cash holdings with lower leverage (LTD/TA) compared to 
non-government owned firms. Furthermore it also has greater ability 
to raise external fund. However, from the view of agency problem 
high cash holdings or equity issues can depress firm performance if it 








3.3 Hypothesis Development 
This study acknowledged one hypothesis which includes the 
relationship between government ownership and firm performance. 
The hypothesis of this investigation is presented in the conceptual 
framework of figure 3.1. 
Past literature found that several variables can influence firm 
performance. Therefore, it is important to isolate and control the 
potential effects of these variables on firm performance. Base on the 
literature, size of firm (Haniffa & Hudib, 2006; Christensen et al., 
2010 and Gurbuz at el., 2010) measured by total assets ratio and firm 
leverage (Christiansen et al., 2010; Ibrahim et al., 2011 and Najid et 
al., 2011) impacted firm performance. Similar with this study, the 
variables are also used as control variable to capture the impact on 
firm performance. Past literature suggested that ownership 
concentration and firm performance are not necessarily related in a 
uniform manner. However, various way has been used for this purpose 
(Thomsen and Pedersen 2000; (Gedajlovic et al. 2003 and Joh 2003). 
Following the study conducted by Chhinbber and Majumdar (1998) 
on 1100 listed firms on the Bombay Stock Exchange, the study 
evaluated the effects of different levels of government ownership on 
firm performance. The level of government ownership were 
categorised as below 26%, 26%-50% and above 51%. The scholars 
concluded that government ownership does affect firm performance 
but at different categories of ownership. ROA is negatively significant 




due to increase in control in board decision making. It was also 
concluded that government ownership of less than 50% is not 
significant and related to firm performance. Similarly, this study 
choose the median as the cut point to divide the percentage of 
government ownership into low ownership, medium ownership and 
large ownership in order to find the relationship with firm 
performance. Following the studies conducted by Zeitun (2007) on 59 
Jordan listed firms from 1989-2002 and Alfaraih et al, (2012) on 
Kuwait 134 listed firms in 2010 it was concluded that government 
ownership regardless of level of ownership have negative relationship 
with firm performance which is consistent with this study. Past 
literature provided mix results of government ownership and firm 
performance. Others tend to emphasise that firms with commercial 
nature ownership able to have better firm value compared to the social 
nature of government ownership. However, Ayud and Hegstad, 
(1986); Haririan, (1989); Wei et al., (2003) and Megginson et al., 
(2004) found government ownership firm as inefficient and 
ineffective. Similar result found by Chhibber and Majumdar (1998) 
empirically investigated the relationship and significance of different 
level of government ownership and firm performance for 1100 listed 
firms on the Bombay Stock Exchange. The study concluded that 
government ownership and firm performance are clearly negatively 
related but significant. The higher the level of government ownership 
the lower firm performed. As opposed to the above, (Wei et al., 2003) 




financial as well in operation. Ang and Ding (2005) investigated the 
relationship between Singapore government linked firms and its firm 
performance over a period of 11-years from 1990-2000. The financial 
results in particular return on equity (ROE) and return on assets 
(ROA) of government linked firms outperformed non-government 
linked firms. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient for government 
linked firms’ and ROA and ROE is found to be significant. A similar 
findings also recorded by Singh and Siah (1998) and Sabhlok (2001) 
that government owned firms are able to match similar levels of 
profitability and efficient performance as non- government owned 
firms. In Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) research, its ROA and ROE 
was found to be at 1% significant correlation with firm performance. 
While studies conducted by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and McConnell 
and Servaes (1990) found government ownership is insignificant with 
firm performance. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) commented that 
ownership concentration has no effect on accounting profits.  A 
similar results also found using Tobin’s Q by McConnell and Servaes 
(1990). Leech and Leahy (1991) found a negative result but 
significant relationship between firm’s profitability and ownership 
concentration. An inverse relationship was also found when the 
government ownership become greater than 50% where the firm value 
declined (Baubakri et al 2017).  Graham et al., (2005) found 400 US 
firms EPS significantly important to measure its firm performance. 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) noted that their corporate ownership 




firm performance. Similar results were also found when the state 
ownership and firm value is positively associated (Tian and Estrin, 
2005). Graham et al., (2005) found 400 US firms EPS significantly 
important to measure its firm performance. The result concluded that 
growth in EPS is linked with managers’ compensation and firm’s 
performance. Ben (2014), analysed firm performance of three 
European countries and found EPS significantly affect firm 
performance of Sweden, Italy and Switzerland. Similar relationship 
was also found by Chan, Chin and Fang (2006), Hatem, (2014) and 
Manish, (2017). Following these studies, the Hypothesis being 
suggested is:  
H1: There is a positive relationship between government ownership 
and the firm’s performance based on ROA, ROE and EPS. 
 
3.4  Research Design  
Methodology of this study is based on the empirical analysis 
conducted by Chhiber and Majumdar, (1998), Zeitun et al. (2007) and 
Baubakri, Ghoul, Guedhami and Megginson (2017). The meaning of 
empirical refers to the actual data and information collected from 
actual evidence, experience, experiment and observation. An 
empirical approach refers to the obligation of the use of selected 
variables for hypothesis that can be tested based on observation, 
evidence and experiment. In research, qualitative methods and 




This thesis used the quantitative method approach. The numerical data 
on government ownership percentage and firm performance in ratio 
and USD amount is collected from each firm’s annual reports and 
databases. These financial information then will be analysed using 
statistical methods. The figure 3.1 below shows the empirical cycle 
adopted form De Groot (1969). 
 
   Figure 3.2 
Empirical Scientific Cycle  
  
                      Observation   
   Evaluation          Induction  
 
        Testing                                               Deduction 
                      Source: Adopted from De Groot (1969) 
Based on the above figure 3.2 De Groot (1969), De Groot (2014) 
quoted the empirical cycle will start by collecting the empirical 
information to form the hypothesis which fall under observation 
process followed by formulation process whereby the hypothesis are 
formulated based on the observation which fall under induction 
process as in the above figure 3.2. Next the hypothesis will be defined 




level of predictions or called deduction as in the above figure 3.2. 
Later it will be tested and finally evaluated against the hypothesis.  
 
3.5  Sampling Technique 
This study aimed to investigate the government ownership and its 
association with firm performance. The data used in this study include 
103 public listed firms on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) which 
covers 515 firm –years for five consecutive years from 2011-2015. 
However, due to outliers, 4 input of firm years has been taken out to 
keep the normality of the study that end up 511 firm years. 
 Table 3.2 above indicate all 103 firms belong to different industrial 
sectors and classified into four categories; Real estate and property, 25 
firms, Services, 35 firms, consumer and trade, 20 firms and 
manufacturing and mining, 23 firms. This study excluded the banking 
and insurance sectors due to characteristics differences in terms of 
reporting firm’s profitability and liquidity on its financial statements 
compared to other selected sectors which use different measurement 
tools of assessment. Table 3.2 shows the industries and number of 








 Sector Representation of the firms in Jordan equity market. 
  Firms Firm - Year Percentage 
Real Estate & Property 25 125 24.3 
Services 35 175 34.0 
Consumer & trade 20 100 19.4 
Manufacturing & Mining 23 115 22.3 
Total 103 515 100 
 
3.6 Data Set 
This thesis researched the secondary data information which is 
publicly available. Survey or questionnaire were not used for this 
analysis since this research mainly focuses on secondary data analysis. 
The data used in this study contain information of each firm’s 
financial performance which is obtained from its financial statement 
published on Bloomberg from year 2011-2015. A detail analysis has 
been conducted in particular on the income statements, balance sheets, 
and ownership structure and percentage holdings of common shares 
by institutions, government, individual and foreign ownership. Their 
full income statement and balance sheets are commonly available for 
public use purpose as required by law to disclose its financial 
statements. For the purpose of this study the government ownership 
has been categorised in three levels with a median point as 28%, 
following the estimation model of Chhinbber and Majumdar, (1998). 




analyse the collected data of government ownership in percentage and 
predictor financial variables and its impact to firm performance. 
Beside three levels of government ownership, this study also test full 
government ownership that represents control over the firm. The 
ownership-performance relationship in this study as well as other 
similar study prompted the likelihood of non-linear function that best 
represents the data (Chhibber and Majumdar, 1998). Although, the 
theoretical perception of linearity as an attractive decision making tool 
in the context of institutional ownership-performance relationship, 
empirically linearity is untenable. This study measures the relationship 
of different levels of government ownership as well as full 
government ownership and financial ratios to firm performance. The 
option to measure different categories of government ownership and 
full government ownership together with other explanatory variables 
that independently affect firm performance through a series of 
separate prediction will be the choice in this study. This will allow a 
separate regression (Maddala, 1977) to be conducted for each firm 
performance. The above approach will rule out the possibilities of 
repetition of one ownership level to another for model estimation 
(Boyce, 1987).   
This study established 103 firms over a five consecutive years with 
government ownership examined into two levels. The first level test 
the government ownership without subdivision and the second level 
using a median point of 28%. Based on this median point, government 




government ownership is below 28% classified as GO low, if 
government ownership between 28%-50% classified as GO medium 
and above 50% known as High Government Ownership. This choice 
of median point is similar to Chhibber and Majumdar (1998), Becht 
and Roell  (1999) and Zeitun et al. (2007) that uses midpoint as 
median to segregate the level of ownership.  
 
3.6.1 Pooled Data 
A panel data set was pooled from 103 firms’ listed on Amman Stock 
Exchange. The data uses financial accounting ratios to measure firm’s 
performance; ROA, ROE and EPS. These data represent dependent 
variables as firm performance. The explanatory variables for this 
study are the government ownership fractions. Along with six 
independent variables; long term debt to total assets, current ratio, 
capital expenditures, age, market to book value and total assets of the 
firm, the two control variables are long term debt to total assets (ratio), 
and total assets (USD amount value) of the firm. 
 
3.7 Analysis Technique 
This research used Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) 
software to evaluate the collected data. The secondary data observed 
was from 2011-2015 for 103 selected PLCs annual reports and 




government ownership and financial performance of the firms. The 
use of secondary data and its test are parametric since it involve 
numeric data. The collected data are re-looked and cleaned by taking 
out the outliers and missing variables to make sure the suitability of 
the data to explain the purpose of the study.  
Once the data is cleaned, the technical analysis process for this begin 
by analysing the descriptive statistics, the Pearson Correlation testing 
will be conducted to analysed the correlation between the variables 
used. The aim of this testing is to express the strength and direction of 
two variables relationship. Other than that, it is vital to find the issue 
of multicollinearity to confirm the reliability of this study. The 
Pearson Correlation and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Durbin 
Watson analysis test will be conduct for this purpose.  
The next technical process is the work on multiple linear regressions. 
The objective of this work is to regress using a general model to find 
the ‘direct effect’ of government ownership and other independent 
variables on the firm performance (ROA, ROE and EPS).  This study 
developed 12 models as below: 
Model 1, 2 and 3 measure firm performance for three different level of 






































β0  = Intercept 
Perf        = Firm Performance measured by Return on Assets (ROA),  
               Return on Equity (ROE) and Earnings Per Share (EPS) 
GO Low  = Government Ownership less than 28% 
GO Medium = Government Ownership ≥28%- <50%  
GO High = Government Ownership more than ≥50% 
TA  = Total Assets 
MTBV  = Market to Book value 
LTDTA  = Long Term Debt to Total Assets 
CR  = Current Ratio 
CAPEX  = Capital Expenditures 
Age  = Age of firm established 
YR  = Year effect 
 
 
Model 4, 5 and 6 measure firm performance for three different level of 










































β0  = Intercept 
Perf  = Firm Performance measured by Return on Assets 
(ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) and Earnings Per 
Share (EPS) 
GO Low = Government Ownership less than 28% 
GO Medium = Government Ownership ≥28%- <50%  
GO High = Government Ownership more than ≥50% 
TA  = Total Assets 
MTBV  = Market to Book value 
LTDTA = Long Term Debt to Total Assets 
CR  = Current Ratio 
CAPEX = Capital Expenditures 
Age  = Age of firm established 
 
Model 7, 8 and 9 measures firm performance for government 
ownership without breaking them into low, medium and high 






































β0  = Intercept 
Perf      = Firm Performance measured by Return on Assets 
(ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) and Earnings Per 
Share (EPS) 
GOV_ full = Government Ownership full 
TA  = Total Assets 
MTBV  = Market to Book value 
LTDTA  = Long Term Debt to Total Assets 
CR  = Current Ratio 
CAPEX  = Capital Expenditures 
Age  = Age of firm established 
YR  = Year effect 
 
Model 10, 11 and 12 measure firm performance for government 
ownership without breaking them into low, medium and high 






































β0  = Intercept 
Perf  = Firm Performance measured by Return on Assets 
(ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) and Earnings Per 
Share (EPS) 
GOV_ full = Government Ownership full 
TA  = Total Assets 
MTBV  = Market to Book value 
LTDTA = Long Term Debt to Total Assets 
CR  = Current Ratio 
CAPEX = Capital Expenditures 










                                               FINDINGS 
 
The previous chapter explained the hypothesis development and the 
research methodology. This chapter is aimed to present the outcome 
of the data analysis and interpret the findings of the statistical analysis. 
The outcome of these test are reported in the descriptive analysis and 
regression analysis section below. This study uses multiple regression 
approach for statistical analysis to measure firm performance. Other 
various diagnostic tests are discussed below included in this approach 
are normality test, linearity, multicollinearity test; Durbin Watson 
tests, autocorrelation, homoscedastic, variance of the error terms, 
Heteroscedasticity, VIF, PP-plot and Scatter plot.   
 
4.0 Descriptive Analysis 
The descriptive analysis is a summary that briefly analyse the basic 
features of the data used in this thesis. The descriptive test covers the 
minimum and maximum of the dependent, independent and control 
variables. The mean value of this statistical test will reveal the central 
tendency and standard deviation of the sample studied. The 








 Descriptive Statistics of Jordan Equity Market 
                Sample of 103 firms from 2011-2015.  
 




ROA 511 0.788 7.518 -34.849 31.204 




EPS 511 0.0720 0.420 -1.226 5.075 
Age 511 23.057 17.471 2.000 91.000 
Capex 511 2.149 6.743 0.000 75.000 
Current ratio 511 2.321 2.742 0.000 25.614 
LTermDebtAssets  511 5.327 8.193 0.000 51.000 
Mkt_Book value 511 1.299 1.217 0.174 14.264 
Total Assets 511 112.753 291.682 0.779 2541.262 
Note: Min.= Minimum; Max.=Maximum; ROA=Return on Assets;  
ROE= Return on Equity; EPS = Earnings Per Share 
 
The table 4.1 reports the descriptive analysis of Jordan equity 
performance. Among the three dependent variables, ROE has the 
highest maximum value of 56.6% compare to ROA of 31% and EPS 
of 5%. The minimum value for ROE also high with -161%. The mean 
t- test measures dependent variables ROA, ROE and EPS for firm 
performance with independent variables of capital expenditure, 
current ratio, long term debt to total assets, market book value and 
total assets. Average mean for ROA, ROE and EPS are 0.788, 0.319 
and 0.072 respectively where ROA has the greater mean then others. 
As for independent variables, Total Assets has the highest mean of 
112.753 followed by Age with 23.057. Market to book value has the 
lowest mean of 1.299. Standard deviation for all variables are high 
except for EPS, 0.420. The highest standard deviation is total Assets, 
291.682 followed by Age and ROE within 17%. Others within 10%.  




from negative to positive value but all independent values are only 
maximum values and are slightly skewed.  
 
4.1   Correlation  
Table 4.2 
Pearson Correlation Matrix for firm performance (ROA). 
 


















































































      1 0.110
* 
0.016 -0.057 
TA        1 -
0.056 
-0.031 





         1 
Note: *Significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
ROA = Return on Assets; GO Low= Government Ownership 28% and less; GO 
Medium= Government Ownership 28%-50%; GO High= Government Ownership 
more than 51%; Age= firm age; Capex= capital expenditures; MTBV= market to 











Pearson Correlation Matrix for firm performance (ROE) 
 


















































































      1 0.110
* 
0.016 -0.057 
TA        1 -
0.056 
-0.031 





         1 
Note: *Significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
ROE = Return on Equity; GO Low= Government Ownership 28% and less; GO 
Medium= Government Ownership 28%-50%; GO High Government Ownership 
more than 51%; Age= firm age; Capex= capital expenditures; MTBV= market to 







Pearson Correlation Matrix for firm performance (EPS) 


















































































      1 0.110
* 
0.016 -0.057 
TA        1 -
0.056 
-0.031 





         1 
Note: *Significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
EPS = Earnings per Share; GO Low= Government Ownership 28% and less GO 
Medium= Government Ownership 28%-50%; GO High Government Ownership 
more than 51%; Age= firm age; Capex= capital expenditures; MTBV= market to 
book value; TA= Total Assets; CR= Current Ratio; LTDTA= long term debt to total 
assets. 
Table 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 indicates the Pearson Correlation Matrix of 
ROA, ROE and EPS for six independent variables and it was found 
that there is no multi collinearity. The highest correlation is 0.629 
between total asset and capital expenditures.  Long term debt to total 
assets is negatively correlated with all other variables except age. 
Current ratio is also negatively correlate with others but not with 
market to book value. Total assets is negatively correlated with long 
term debt and current ratio but correlated positively above average 
with capital expenditure. Market to book value is only negatively 





4.1.1  Correlation Matrix 
The correlation analysis is aimed to find the strength and direction of 
the linear relationship for two continuous variables. The main purpose 
of this analysis is to investigate the strength of correlation between 
independent variables and dependent variables. This study is testing 
ROA, ROE and EPS as the dependent variables while the independent 
variables are Government ownership, Age, Capital expenditures, 
current ratio, total assets, and long term debt to total assets and market 
to book value. This analysis uses the Pearson correlation method for 
this study. The correlation result ranged from a negative association (-
1.0) through zero correlation to a perfect correlation (+1.0).  
Table 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 present the Pearson Correlation Matrix for 
Jordan firm’s performance using ROA, ROE and EPS as proxy for 
firm performance.  
   
4.1.2   Multicollinearity Test 
One of the assumptions in multiple linear regression is that the 
independent variables are not highly correlated. High correlated 
independent variables create the issue of multicollinearity. The 
existence of multicollinearity is tested prior to regression analysis 
using correlation analysis. It tests whether multicollinearity does exist 
among independent variables.  Table 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 illustrates 
correlation matrix for ROA, ROE and EPS. The illustrations of these 




means < 0.7 that prove multicollinearity issue issues does not exist in 
the regression model.  
4.1.3   Durbin Watson Test  
The test for autocorrelation is tested in the residuals from a regression 
analysis statistics. This statistic is a number that is always between 0 
and 4.  A Durbin Watson value of 2 mean autocorrelation does not 
exist in the samples of variables.  This test is also able to explain of 
possible outliers exists within the data. In a liner regression model, the 
error term is a most important component. The model assumes the 
variance of the error term to be constant (homoscedastic) regardless of 
any changes in the independent variables. However, when the error 
term is not constant, it is leading to heteroskedasticity. 
Heteroskedasticity is a violation of one of the assumption of linear 
regression model. This condition will enable the ability of ordinary 
least square as a best linear unbiased estimator. It is common for 
Heteroskedasticity to exist for OLS regression estimation for cross-
sectional and panel data. 
The PP-plot and scatter plot for ROA, ROE and EPS are illustrated in 















Based on Table 4.5, Durbin Watson values for ROA, ROE and EPS 
are 1.966, 2.006 and 1.819 respectively. Therefore it has no 
autocorrelation since all the above are close to 2. 
4.3   Plots 
This test is to check the assumption of homoscedasticity. The 
assumption refers to the variance in the variables are equal. The 
variables used are the predictors and residual.   
The normal distribution of the residual values for ROA, ROE and EPS 
are illustrated in figure 4a, figure 4b, and figure 4c respectively and 
are normally distributed is shown in the appendix section. The 
normality is also being viewed on PP-Plots (figure 5a, 5b and 5c 
respectively in the appendix section) and Scatter Plots for residuals 
values ROA, ROE and EPS are illustrated in figure 6a, figure 6b and 







4.4 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
Multicollinearity is a common issue when estimating a linear 
regression model. This issue exists when independent variables are 
highly correlated. This condition will lead the estimates of regression 
coefficients to be unreliable and unstable. This condition can be 
diagnosed if Variance Inflation factor (VIF) is calculated to identify 
the independent variables that need to be removed from the 
estimation. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is an estimates of degree 
of variance of coefficient which is ‘inflated’ due to linear dependence 
with other independent variables. This study depicted the VIF values 
in Table 4.6 for ROA, ROE and EPS. The VIF of the independent 
variables used in this study is less than 5. Therefore, there is no 
serious problem of multicollinearity (Pallant, 2010). 
 
4.5  Inferential Statistics 
This study estimates ROA, ROE and EPS performance of 103 
Jordanian listed firms’ and represents the population of entire firms 









 VIF and Tolerance values of independent variables  
 for ROA, ROE and EPS.             
 




























































































































4.6  Regression 
The motive of this test is to find the relationship of government 
ownership with firm performance. The Multiple Regression Analysis 
test is conducted to determine the direct effect of the government 
ownership with ROA, ROE and EPS. Since, the government 
ownership is used as the main variables to test the firms’ performance, 
other variables control it and can affect the firms’ performance.  This 




observations for five continuous period from 2011-2015. Table 4.7 
illustrates the multiple regression analysis with controlling for year 
effect for three dependent variables (ROA, ROE and EPS).  
 
4.6.1   Regression Analysis for Amman Stock Exchange  
In this study, the multiple linear regression analysis is conducted 
mainly to determine the direct effect of government ownership as the 
independent variables to influence the dependent variables, (ROA, 
ROE and EPS) or firm performance. Based on the above regression 
tables, four sets of different regression analysis have been conducted 
with independent variables as to control the effect of government 
ownership since it can affect the dependent variables (Demsetz and 
Lehn 1985; Chhibber and Majumdar 1998; Pedersen and Thomsen 
2000 and Ben 2014). The independent variables used in this study 
were long term debt to total assets, total assets, age, capital 
expenditure, current ratio and market to book value. The models used 
in this are in line with Baubakri et al., (2017). This model measures 
firm performance as: Firm Performance = β0 + β1 GO Low (less than 
28%) + β2 GO Medium (≥28%-50%) + β3 GO High (≥50%) + β4 
LTD_TA + β5 CR + β6 TA + β7 MTBV + β8 Capex + β9 Age + β10 
Year I + ε. Similar to other studies, government ownership captures 
the level of percentage owned to differentiate the ownership 
concentration as low and high.  Median was calculated as threshold to 




concentration (Chung and Pruitt (1994); Chhibber and Majumdar, 
1998 and Baubakri et al., 2017). This study measures government 
ownership with median as 28%.  Meaning, government ownership 
below 28% captures small ownership, if 28%-50% as medium 
ownership and over 50% as large ownership. This approach was taken 
based on several past studies model that the level of government 
ownership were broken into several levels such as small, medium and 
large to explain the study (Chhibber and Majumdar, 1998 and 
Baubakriet al., 2017). 
The firm performance is measured by financial performance as 
dependent variables represented by ROA (model1), ROE (model 2) 
and EPS (model 3). Size of the firm represented by firm’s total assets 
that was used as a controlling factor for differences in firm size; 
Leverage was represented by long term debt to total assets. Table 4.7 
and 4.7.3 also take into account the significance of year effect in a 
series of five consecutive years where dummies (0, 1) applied to serve 
control for any chance of time differences effect during the analysis 
period from 2011-2015. The year 2011 was used as base year for 










Model 1 in Table 4.7 illustrates that ROA was not significant and 
negatively related with government ownership. However, other 




ratio and market to book value was significant at 10% except for long 
term debt to total assets at 5%.  
The F-value of 6.430 for Model 1 in Table 4.7 was statistically 
significant at 0.000 (P < 0.0005) and the adjusted R2 was 7.8%. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is not supported as there was a negative 
relationship between government ownership and firm performance. 









Model 2 in table 4.7 also illustrates ROE was positively significant 
and with high government ownership. Other independent variables 
like age and capital expenditure also positively significant at 10% and 
5% respectively.  However, long term debt to total assets and market 
to book value were negatively significant at 1% level.   
The F-value is 13.740 for Model 2 in Table 4.7 was statistically 
significant at 0.000 (P < 0.0005) and the adjusted R2 was 16.7%. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 supported as there is a positive relationship 
between high government ownership and firm performance. 













Model 3 in Table 4.7 illustrates that EPS was not significant and 
negatively related to government ownership.  Other independent 
variables like Long term debt to total assets also negatively related 
with firm performance with 1% significant level. However, total 
assets, age and current ratio were positively significant at 1%-5%.   
The F-value of 21.457 for Model 3 in Table 4.7 was statistically 
significant at 0.000 (P < 0.0005) and the adjusted R2 was 7.8%. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is not supported as there was a negative 
relationship between government ownership and firm performance. 
The regressions results of H1 are presented in Table 4.7 In each of the 
three models, empirically applied multiple regression analysis for the 
variables and performed the goodness of fit tests for the overall model. 
The estimated coefficients of the variables, adjusted R2 results, p-
values of t-statistics, and p-values of f-statistics were all displayed.  
This study adopts the standard rule of significant level, p-values, 
(probability of failing to reject H0), if less than 10% level is accepted 
as significance level.  
The initial test was carried out to test the goodness of fit of 103 firms 
using Multiple Regression approach. The  independent variables for 
age which represent the years of business established supports the 
study when all the three dependent value (ROA, ROE and EPS) were 
positively significant at 5% for ROA, at 10% for ROE and at 1% for 
EPS with firm performance. Meaning, the longer the firm has been 
established in its operation the better the financial performance of the 




total assets at 1% for all three models in explaining the fitness of 
study. However, it was negatively related with firm performance.  
This study also take into account the possibility of excluding the year 
effect when government ownership is tested at all three level, low, 
medium and high. Table 4.7.1 indicate that EPS was negatively 
significant at 5% level with government ownership less than 28% 
when its adjusted R-Square is 25.2%.  Control variables like long term 
debt to total assets, age, Total assets, Capex, current ratio and market 
to book value also found to be significant with firm performance. 
Among them, long term debt to total assets and age were consistently 
significant for all three dependent values. However, long term debt to 
total assets was negatively significant at 1% level but age was 
positively significant at 1% level.  
Similarly, this study also examined the firm performance when the 
government ownership without subdividing them into three levels as 
well as ignoring the year effect. This study contribute to the literature 
that full government ownership is positively link with firm 
performance. Table 4.7.2 indicate that when tested for full government 
ownership, ROE was positively related at 5% significant level when 
its R-Square was 16.9%. All control variables also significant for this 
measurement. Among all, long term debt to total assets and age were 
consistently significant with all three dependent variables. However, 
long term debt to total assets is negatively significant at 1% level but 





A similar finding was also found when this study continued the 
investigation by adding the existence of year effect. Table 4.7.3 
indicate again that Government full ownership was tested to be 
positively significant at 5% with ROE when its R-Square is 17.5%. 
All control variables used in this study also indicate significant with 
firm performance. Long term debt to total assets and age were 
consistently significant at 1% with ROA, ROE and EPS. However, 
year effect does not give any effect to this study. Nevertheless, long 
term debt to total assets was negatively related with firm performance 
but age was positively related with firm performance.  
 
4.7  The Year Effect: 2011 as the base year 
Table 4.7 illustrates the summary of regression of the dependent 
variables and independent variables with additional variable of year 
effect as controlling for year (Beuselinck et al., 2017). The time series 
of five consecutive years from 2011 to 2015 has been adopted to find 
and impact in firms’ performance due to particular change in Jordan’s 
economic variable. This study uses 2011 as the base year to measure 
changes for other years. The result indicate the coefficient on the 
ROA, ROE and EPS on a series of 5 years with dummy variable, (0, 
1), reports the differences of ROA, ROE and EPS between 2011 (base 
year) and other years holding that other independent variables 
constant. The report concludes that the ROA for year 2012, 2013, 
2014 and 2015 were greater than 2011. Meaning, if base year (2011) 




instance year 2012 was 1.926 point, 2013 was 1.813 point, 2014 was 
1.985 point and 2015 was 0.107 point. This growth could be due to 
continuous rise in GDP per capita and exports as reported in figure 10 
in the appendix. Although the ROA for 2012, 2013 and 2014 
performed positively greater than 2011 with a slight drop in 2015 but 
they were not significant with firm performance. These result 
conclude that the year effect analysis was not important for this study.  
Similarly analysis also conducted on the impact of year on ROE. The 
ROE for year 2012, 2013 and 2014 performed positively greater than 
2011. Taking 2011 as the base again (1.0), 2012, 2013 and 2014 
reported 3.67, 2.026 and 3.869 respectively. However, ROE declined 
in year 2015 to -1.383 from 1.0 in 2011. This could be due to a drop in 
economic growth. The World Bank data reported in spring 2013 that 
the GDP in annual variation in percentage from 2011 reported a rising 
rate in 2012, 2013, 2014 (2.7%, 2.8%, and 3.1% respectively) but 
dropped in 2015 to 2.4%. This decline coupled with rising debt 
amount, both public debt and external debt from 2014 to 2015 as in 
Figure 10 in appendix shows the obligation to fulfil debt interest may 
have impacted negatively on the ROE in 2015.  However, this 
findings was also not significant to firm performance. 
Likewise, the coefficient of EPS for all the comparative years also 
reported to be greater in all four years compared to the base year. It 
shows the EPS for 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 was positive 0.066, 




point 1.0. However, this positive performance was also reported as not 
significant to measure firm performance. 
The multiple regression method for ROA, ROE and EPS regressed 
with the use of SPSS package for the year effect computation results 
are in the appendix.  The ROA R square, F test and significance value 
of variables are depicted in Figure 7a, figure 7b and figure 7c. The 
similar computation for ROE are illustrated in figure 8a, 8b, 8c, and 
9a, 9b and 9c for EPS.  This regression also tests the impact of 
government ownership with all six independent variables and time 
affect. The significance and relationship of multiple regression result 
remain the same as without the year effect. The long term debt to total 
assets was negatively significant at 1% level with firm performance 
but the age was positively significant at 5%, 10% and 1% respectively 












Table 4.7:  
Regression Analysis for ROA, ROE and EPS for 103 listed  
firms’ independent variables with government ownership   
             low, medium and high with year effect. 





















































































Adjusted R2 8.7% 16.3% 23.9% 
F-Stats 4.734 8.645 13.306 
Number of 
observation 
511 511 511 














 Regression Analysis for ROA, ROE and EPS for 103 listed   
 firms’ independent variables with government ownership    
 low, medium and high without year effect  






























































Adjusted R2 8.1% 17.1% 25.2% 
F-Stats 5.983 12.727 20.052 
Number of 
observation 
511 511 511 


















Table 4.7.2:  
Regression Analysis for ROA, ROE and EPS for 103 listed                
 firms’ independent variables with government ownership     
(all) without year effect  





















































Adjusted R2 7.9% 16.9% 24.4% 
F-Stats 7.245 15.809 24.563 
Number of 
observation 
511 511 511 





















 Table 4.7.3 
 Regression Analysis for ROA, ROE and EPS for 103 listed   
 firms’ independent variables with government ownership  
(all) with year effect . 











































































Adjusted R2 8.5% 17.5% 24.1% 
F-Stats 5.327 10.833 15.758 
Number of 
observation 
511 511 511 
Note: *, **, *** significant at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels respectively.  
 
4.8 Findings Summary 
The Jordan economic growth has been reported to be fairly resilient 
from 2014 to 2015 despite high levels of public debt and unfortunate 
conflict in the region and its spill over effect. The Syrian refugee 




to these, the domestic tourism industry is greatly affected. The influx 
of Syrian refugees also affected the public funding and informal 
labour market and exports market. It also affected Jordan’s balance of 
trade when the closure of Syrian transit routes increased the demand 
for imports due to Syrian refugee demand.  
Based on the above economic impact this paper predicted that the firm 
performance would be affected and an analysis was conducted to 
unveil the descriptive and regression findings that was obtained from 
the above data analysis. The purpose is also to discuss the results that 
was interpreted in the section 4.4 for each hypothesis with relevant 
supporting literature.  
Table 4.8 below illustrates the dependent variables (ROA, ROE and 
EPS) maximum return and minimum return with average return for 
five consecutive period. ROE return is reported to be the highest 
return with 56.625% compared to ROA and EPS. However, ROA 
reported to be having higher average return of 0.79% compared to 
ROE 0.32%.  The profitability result in this study is consistent with 
empirical analysis by Abramov et al. (2017) that investigated 114 








Table 4.8  
Firm Performance Return for 2011-2015 
Firm Performance 
(dependent variables) 
Maximum Minimum Mean 
ROA 31.204 -34.849 0.788 
ROE 56.625 -161.833 0.319 
EPS 5.075 -1.226 0.007 
 
Past literature has provided mix views of relationship between 
government ownership and firm performance. The firm performance 
also have been popularly discussed as market value performance or 
accounting value performance. (Markides, 1995) noted that the 
literature commonly reported ROE, ROA and ROS (return on sales) 
have similar empirical quality for measuring performance.  This study 
uses ROA, ROE and EPS as proxy to firm performance. It also uses 
multiple regression to capture the effect of independent variables on 
dependent variables more consistently and systematically (Morrow, 
Johnson and Busenitz, 2004 and Abebe and Alvarado, 2013). 
Based on the analysis conducted on Table 4.7, low government 
ownership (<28%) is not significant and negatively related with firm 
performance measured by ROA, ROE and EPS. As for medium 
government ownership (≥28%-50%) EPS was also not significant and 
negatively related with firm performance. However, ROA and ROE 
was positively related but not significant. A similar findings was also 
found in high government ownership (≥ 50%) when the ROA and 
ROE were positively related but not significant. As for EPS the high 




This result is consistent with Chhibber and Majumdar (1998) where 
government ownership below 26% and government ownership 
between 26%-50% were found to be not significant with ROA (return 
on assets) and ROS (return on sales)  as proxy to firm performance.  
Chhibber and Majumdar (1998) also found similar relation with ROA 
and ROS as additional dimension of firm performance. However, this 
result is not consistent with Baubakri et al., (2017) who reported 
positively significant at 1% level when government ownership 
between 30%-50% to value firm performance. The scholars used 
market to book value as the dependent value to represent firm value. 
However, if year effect is omitted in this analysis, government 
ownership at less than 28% is negatively significant at 5% level as 
indicated in table 4.7.1. Further analysis were conducted to study the 
impact of government ownership to firm performance. Table 4.7.2 
analysed if government ownership tested in full percentage instead of 
breaking them into 3 levels.  The findings indicate that government 
ownership was positively significant with ROE at 5% level with or 
without the function of year effect.  
Based on the above literature, this study derived the following testable 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between government 




Hypothesis 1a: There is a positive relationship between 
government ownership of less than 28% and firm performance 
without year effect 
Chhibber and Majumdar (1998), reported the insignificant role of 
government ownership less than 26%. The study consider government 
ownership less than 26% is a passive investment. They noted that low 
ownership is associated with low influence on the firm performance. 
The coefficient estimate report ROA and ROS (-0.053 and -0.078 
respectively) were negatively related and not significant. 
Abramov et al. (2017) examined government ownership based on 
direct and indirect ownership of 114 firms. 33 of the 74 State owned 
firms were indirectly owned by the government considered significant 
and positively related with ROE.  
Liao and Young (2012) investigated the impact of government 
ownership on 514 Chinese firms using panel data and multivariate 
regression. The ROA is labelled as 1 if the government ownership is 
the largest at the time of listing otherwise zero. They found the 
coefficient for ROA was positively significant when government 
owned shares in the firms.  Based on the above mixed result found on 
the relationship of government ownership and firm performance the 
following hypothesis is derived, 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between government 




Hypothesis 2a: There is a positive relationship between 
government ownership at 28%-50% and firm performance 
without year effect. 
 
Again mix results was also found in the past literature with regards to 
government ownership more than 50% and the impact to firm 
performance. Among the few, Shepherd (1989); Laffont and Tirole 
(1993); Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) and Pedersen and Thomsen 
(1997) strongly commented that government ownership was 
negatively related with firms’ financial performance. Pedersen and 
Thompsen (1997) also commented that high government ownership 
was a detrimental to firm value.  They viewed that governments were 
likely to be more politically inclined to meet their political goals such 
as low output prices, provide employment for national sectors, non- 
profit maximising behaviour (Arrow, 1969 and Shepherd, 1989) and 
to correct market failures (Shepherd 1989). All these motives were 
perceived not sufficient to perform better than profit orientated firms 
like the private entities. This result is consistent with Baubakri et al, 
(2017) that their robust evidence of government ownership above 50% 
on 1386 listed firms from nine East Asian countries’ was negatively 
related with firm value. Zeitun and Tian (2007) investigated 59 Jordan 
public listed firms in 1989-2002. They found government ownership 
is significant but negatively related with ROE and comment further 
that government aimed to focus more on providing social benefit 




Majumdar, (1998) on 1110 firm listed on Bombay Stock Exchange. 
The study reported high government ownership enabled the 
government to exercise control in decision making. However, the 
empirical results was negatively significant at 5% with firm financial 
performance measured by ROA and ROS (return on sales).  
To conclude this section, this study derived the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between government 
ownership of more than 50% and firm performance with year 
effect 
 
Hypothesis 3a: There is a positive relationship between 
government ownership of more than 50% and firm performance 
without year effect. 
This study also develop further hypothesis with regards to government 
ownership that ignored the existence of three level of government 
ownership but add all as full percentage of equity ownership. As such 
it derived the following hypothesis: 
The study examine further if the year effect is not considered. As such 





Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between full 
government ownership and firm performance without year effect 
Hypothesis 4a: There is a positive relationship between full 

























        CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
The chapter above discussed the findings of this study. This paper 
empirically examine the impact of government ownership on Jordan’s listed 
firms from 2011-2015. The study used Multiple Regression technique to 
regress the variables. This chapter also seeks determining the objectives of 
the study are being met.  
 
5.0 Discussion  
 Research Objective 1: To investigate the relationship of government 
ownership with firm performance measured by ROA, ROE and EPS.  
Table 5.1 illustrates Hypothesis H1 that government ownership of < 
28% was not significant and negatively related with ROA, ROE and 
EPS. A similar result also found when the ownership is ≥28%-50%. 
This findings are consistent with other studies like Chhibber and 
Majumdar (1998). However, ROE is positively related with firm 
government ownership ≥28%-50% but not significant. This result 
contradict with Baubakri et al., (2017) when they reported that 
government with the largest ultimate owner of 30%-50% of the 
domestic government was positively significant at 1% with firm value 




time of distress would be the main reason for shareholders and 
investor to support this relationship. 
The hypothesis H1 that governs the relationship of government 
ownership < 28%% is not related and significant with firm 
performance when year effect is taken into consideration. Similar 
result also found in H2 and H3. However, the hypothesis H1a, H2a 
and H3a are hypothesis that ignored the existence of year effect. Only 
H1a is negatively significant with EPS. The government ownership-
firm performance relationship was poorly responded in ROA and 
ROE and not significant with firm performance. This concludes that 
even firms with higher government ownership do not give financial 
improvement impact. This could be due to conservative perception 
that government’s motive was to merely support social benefit of the 
nation and their political objectives by using these firms instead of 
maximising shareholders wealth. In Jordan, ROE responded 
insignificant to firm performance unlike in China. Trien Le, (2011) 
reported that government owned firm was positively significant with 
firm performance (ROA). In China, the investors are willing to invest 
in firms with high government ownership. This study concludes that 
EPS was significant but negatively related with the study at low level 
of government ownership. It concludes that when government owned 
less controlling shares meaning below 28%, firms EPS will drop. 
In hypothesis H4 and H4a concludes that government ownership when 
measured in full percentage owned in a firm is positively significant 




firm performance also increase. This finding is in line with the 
objective of corporate finance that is to maximise shareholders wealth 
by giving out higher return for earnings.  
 
Table 5.1:  
Summary for Research Objective  








There is a positive relationship between government 
ownership 
 [< 28%] and firm’s performance.  
There is a positive relationship between government 
ownership 
 [< 28%] and firm’s performance.  
There is a positive relationship between government 
ownership 

















There is a positive relationship between government 
ownership  
[< 28%] and the firms’ performance.  
There is a positive relationship between government 
ownership [<28%] and the firms’ performance 
There is a positive relationship between government 
ownership [<28%] and the firms’ performance 
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There is a positive relationship between government 
ownership [≥28%-50%] and the firms’ performance.  
There is a positive relationship between  government 
ownership 
















There is a positive relationship between government 
ownership [≥28%-50%] and the firms’ performance. 
There is a positive relationship between government 
ownership [≥28%-50%] and the firms’ performance.  
There is a positive relationship between government 

























There is a positive relationship between government 
ownership [≥50%] and the firms’ performance. 
There is a positive relationship between government 
ownership [≥50%] and the firms’ performance.  
There is a positive relationship between government 























There is a positive relationship between government 
ownership [≥50%] and the firms’ performance. 
There is a positive relationship between government 
ownership [≥50%] and the firms’ performance.  
There is a positive relationship between government 




























There is a positive relationship between government 
ownership 
and firm’s performance.  
There is a positive relationship between government 
ownership 
 and firm’s performance.  
There is a positive relationship between government 
ownership 






















There is a positive relationship between government 
ownership 
 and firm’s performance.  
There is a positive relationship between government 
ownership 
 and firm’s performance.  
There is a positive relationship between government 
ownership 
















Based on table 5.1 a statistically mixed results were found when the 
study takes into consideration the year effect and level of government 
ownership. An insignificant relationship was found between 
government ownership concentration and firm performance (ROA, 
ROE and EPS) when year effect was taken into consideration. 
However, when year effect was ignored, a significant result found for 




performance. It can be concluded that low government ownership tend 
to be negatively relate with firm performance.  
However, when full government ownership was used without 
breaking up the level of government ownership, it indicated a positive 
and significant relationship with firm performance using ROE as the 
dependent variable. It presents a similar finding when the year effect 
was ignored. 
These poor performance could be due to uncertain political changes in 
Jordan coupled with the Syrian conflict that impacted the aggregate 
economy. Some of the financial impact was a rise in external debt and 
imports. These give impact rising in unemployment in several sectors 
particularly the tourism and services sectors. 
Nevertheless, as noted by Stigler (1971), government economic policy 
and regulation on firms are positively correlated. In this context, even 
though regulation essentially meant to protect certain favoured firms 
from market competition but it can reduce the efficiency of the 
regulated industry. Similarly, Jordanian regulated firms also can face 








 5.1  Contribution of Study 
This study contributes a significant and consistent result of the 
relationship between government ownership and firm performance. 
Government ownership below 28% is significant but negatively 
related with EPS. This findings is consistent with other empirical 
studies that examine the relationship between government ownership 
concentrations - firm performance.  A similar view but opposite 
direction was found in a study investigated by Trien Le (2011) on 
China. The scholar pointed out the importance of Chinese government 
to own more share in order to give confidence for investors for a 
better firm performance.  
Beside government ownership, this study also contribute and 
consistent results when control for leverage and age. The Long term 
debt to total assets is negatively significant at 1% level. It implies that 
leverage is inversely related with ROA, ROE and EPS.  When control 
for age of the firm to find the impact to firm performance, age is 
significant at 5% and 10% level. Statistically age responded positively 
with all three dependent indicator.  
In this study the year effect give no impact for firm performance. The 
full government ownership category was used as an added view in this 
study. The result contribute that government ownership is positively 
related with firm performance (ROE) at 5% significant level. A 
similar result also found when year effect was ignored in this case.  




reported that government ownership is negatively significant with 
ROA and ROE. Nevertheless, this study found significant relationship 
of long term debt to assets and the age of business operation to 
influence firms’ performance. It reveals that  the higher the ratio of 
long term debt to total assets  in the firm’s capital structure, the lower 
the performance of ROA, ROE and EPS regardless at any level of 
government ownership in the firm.  
As for policy makers, these results conclude that government 
ownership to certain extent play an important role for equity holders 
to maximise their wealth. This study would suggest Jordan to consider 
a mixed enterprise ownership in developing the economy. The 
findings of the paper also support the view of Peter Evans’s (1995) 
discussion of firm to segregate the control of firms based on their 
strength and create a mixed ownership entity. Following the success 
of the Korean Information Technology Industry, the Government left 
the key role of the operation to the private entities while other sectors 
was looked after by the government. These arrangement brought 









5.2 Future Studies 
In the future studies, an additional variable like systematic risk can be 
considered as a risk variable that take into account the risk factor of 
firms’ stock return. This approach is similar to Dimson’s (1979) 
approach that reported beta factor as an influencing variable to affect 
the degree of firm performance. Alternatively, the firm value is also 




The study’s limitation is that it takes into account the time series 
during the financial crisis that affect the entire MIDA region that may 
cause the results to be unstable. The sample taken for five year period 




The Arab spring demonstration in 2011 has led the Jordanian King 
Abdullah II to dismiss the cabinet and take full authority of the 
judiciary and parliament. This effort has given the wake of State 
capitalism and the need to live with government ownership of 
corporations. Since then, the 2008 global financial crisis and 2011 




government effort to own more shares in previously privatised firms 
as a bailing out strategy. The impact of government ownership on firm 
performance is the main focus of the study. This study rekindles many 
views against government ownership in terms of poor profit 
maximization and shareholders’ wealth. Nevertheless, firms with 
government ownership have also been viewed positively as a platform 
to benefit financially distressed firms. In addition, government 
ownership also allows easy access to fund and effective monitoring 
for shareholders.   
The impact of government ownership has been statistically examined 
using a multiple regression analysis approach. The analysis revealed 
government ownership is positively significant at 5% with ROE. It 
also revealed that the other independent variables like long term debt 
to total assets and age of operations are also significant across all three 
dependent variables. The long term debt to total assets ratio is 
negatively significant at 1% but age is positively significant at 5% to 
10%. 
This chapter revisited the objective of this study and ensured that the 
analysis and results were met. The impact of government ownership 
on firm performance has been a central question in this study. 
However, the evidence of the nature of this relationship shows 
government ownership has positive impact to (ROE) firm 
performance. These findings are consistent with the view that 
shareholders are confident of the benefits they can have with 




and effective government monitoring procedure for shareholders. This 
evidence is consistent with the theories and empirical findings 
propound by (Baubakri et al., 2017) that government ownership above 
50% also affect firm performance but negatively. However, others 
suggest this relationship is irrelevant (Zeitun and Tian, 2007).  
This study also investigated the relationship of other independent 
variables with firm performance. The regression analysis concluded 
that long term debt to total assets ratio is inversely related with firm 
performance. The increase in the level of debt will decrease the 
financial performance of the firm measured by ROA, ROE and EPS. 
However, age is positively related with firm performance. Age 
represents the years of business established. All the three dependent 
values ROA, ROE and EPS are positively significant and related to 
firm performance. Meaning, the longer the firm has been established 
the better the financial performance of the firm. 
This study also concludes that government ownership below 28% is 
significant but negatively related to firm performance. Therefore, this 
study conclude that lower government ownership destroys the value of 
firms that they invest it might provide a negative signal to the other 
investors. On the other hand, higher level government ownership may 
help boost the firm performance through the government interference 
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Figure 5  
EPS Normal distribution of Residual 
 
                            
 
Figure 5a  
PP Plot for ROA 
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 Figure 7a 
R Square for ROA. Regression analysis, government ownership and    
year effect 
           
1.  2. R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 













Square F Sig. 
1 Regressio
n 
3193.710 13 245.670 4.763 .000b 
Residual 25633.957 497 51.577   
Total 28827.666 510    
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Yr2015, Capital Exp, GO_Low, Long Term Debt Total 
Asset , Market to Book Value, Current Ratio, Yr2013, Age , GO_Medium, 
















 ROA, regression analysis, independent variables,  

































t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -.602 1.129  -.533 .594 
Long Term Debt 
Total Asset 
-.146 .040 -.159 -3.623 .000 
Total Assets .000 .001 .015 .271 .787 
Market to Book 
Value 
-.515 .269 -.083 -1.917 .056 
Capital Exp .147 .063 .132 2.352 .019 
Age .060 .021 .138 2.898 .004 
Current Ratio .255 .119 .093 2.136 .033 
GO_Low -.077 .050 -.090 -1.547 .122 
GO_Medium -.027 .028 -.052 -.957 .339 
GO_High -.001 .014 -.006 -.103 .918 
Yr2012 2.029 1.011 .108 2.008 .045 
Yr2013 1.872 1.008 .100 1.856 .064 
Yr2014 1.914 1.006 .102 1.903 .058 
Yr2015 .297 1.008 .016 .294 .769 






Figure 8a:  
R Square for ROE. Regression Analysis, government ownership and 








































Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .446a .199 .178 15.481178 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Yr2015, Capital Exp, GO_Low, Long Term Debt 
Total Asset , Market to Book Value, Current Ratio, Yr2013, Age , 







Square F Sig. 
1 Regressio
n 
29503.623 13 2269.509 9.469 .000b 
Residual 119114.436 497 239.667   
Total 148618.059 510    
a. Dependent Variable: ROE 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Yr2015, Capital Exp, GO_Low, Long Term Debt 
Total Asset , Market to Book Value, Current Ratio, Yr2013, Age , GO_Medium, 










 ROE, regression analysis, independent variables, government 










t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.009 2.434  .414 .679 
Long Term Debt 
Total Asset 
-.450 .087 -.216 -5.193 .000 
Total Assets .004 .003 .076 1.413 .158 
Market to Book 
Value 
-3.660 .579 -.261 -6.317 .000 
Capital Exp .367 .135 .145 2.720 .007 
Age .105 .044 .107 2.366 .018 
Current Ratio .438 .257 .070 1.701 .090 
GO_Low -.145 .108 -.074 -1.348 .178 
GO_Medium .000 .060 .000 -.007 .995 
GO_High .047 .029 .090 1.600 .110 
Yr2012 3.563 2.178 .083 1.636 .103 
Yr2013 2.168 2.173 .051 .998 .319 
Yr2014 3.868 2.168 .091 1.784 .075 
Yr2015 -.921 2.173 -.022 -.424 .672 












 Figure 9a  
 R Square for EPS. Regression analysis, government ownership and  


















Square F Sig. 
1 Regressio
n 
24.115 13 1.855 13.987 .000b 
Residual 65.913 497 .133   
Total 90.028 510    
a. Dependent Variable: EPS 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Yr2015, Capital Exp, GO_Low, Long Term Debt 
Total Asset , Market to Book Value, Current Ratio, Yr2013, Age , 














Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .518a .268 .249 .36417303 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Yr2015, Capital Exp, GO_Low, Long Term Debt 
Total Asset , Market to Book Value, Current Ratio, Yr2013, Age , 








EPS, regression analysis, independent variables, government 

































t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -.045 .057  -.787 .432 
Long Term Debt 
Total Asset 
-.008 .002 -.154 -
3.866 
.000 
Total Assets .000 .000 .336 6.567 .000 
Market to Book 
Value 
.019 .014 .056 1.412 .159 
Capital Exp .003 .003 .041 .796 .426 
Age .004 .001 .170 3.918 .000 
Current Ratio .018 .006 .120 3.029 .003 
GO_Low -.007 .003 -.147 -
2.778 
.006 
GO_Medium -.002 .001 -.077 -
1.563 
.119 
GO_High -.001 .001 -.109 -
2.037 
.042 
Yr2012 .064 .051 .061 1.246 .213 
Yr2013 .034 .051 .033 .672 .502 
Yr2014 .032 .051 .030 .623 .533 
Yr2015 .004 .051 .004 .073 .942 








R Square for ROA. Regression analysis, government ownership and 

















Square F Sig. 
1 Regressio
n 
2797.507 9 310.834 5.983 .000b 
Residual 26030.159 501 51.956   
Total 28827.666 510    
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
b. Predictors: (Constant), GO_High, Current Ratio, Market to Book Value, 















Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .312a .097 .081 7.20807921 
a. Predictors: (Constant), GO_High, Current Ratio, Market to Book Value, 







ROA, regression analysis, independent variables,     government ownership 


































t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .645 .951  .678 .498 
Long Term Debt 
Total Asset 
-.148 .040 -.161 -3.663 .000 
Total Assets .000 .001 .015 .264 .792 
Market to Book 
Value 
-.561 .269 -.091 -2.090 .037 
Capital Exp .152 .063 .136 2.425 .016 
Age .060 .021 .140 2.939 .003 
Current Ratio .253 .120 .092 2.110 .035 
GO_Low -.076 .050 -.088 -1.515 .130 
GO_Medium -.025 .028 -.049 -.898 .370 
GO_High -.001 .014 -.006 -.106 .915 







R Square for ROE. Regression analysis, government ownership and 

















Square F Sig. 
1 Regressi
on 








   
a. Dependent Variable: ROE 
b. Predictors: (Constant), GO_High, Current Ratio, Market to Book 
Value, Total Assets, Long Term Debt Total Asset , GO_Medium, 















Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .431a .186 .171 15.538455 
a. Predictors: (Constant), GO_High, Current Ratio, Market 
to Book Value, Total Assets, Long Term Debt Total Asset , 





Figure 11c  
ROE, regression analysis, independent variables, government 










t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 












Total Assets .004 .003 .076 1.41
1 
.159 
Market to Book 
Value 




Capital Exp .377 .135 .149 2.78
9 
.005 
Age .104 .044 .107 2.35
3 
.019 
Current Ratio .438 .258 .070 1.69
8 
.090 




GO_Medium .002 .060 .002 .035 .972 
GO_High .047 .029 .091 1.61
9 
.106 












Figure 12a  
R Square for EPS. Regression analysis, government ownership and 


















Square F Sig. 
1 Regress
ion 
23.842 9 2.649 20.05
2 
.000b 
Residual 66.186 501 .132   
Total 90.028 510    
a. Dependent Variable: EPS 
b. Predictors: (Constant), GO_High, Current Ratio, Market to 
Book Value, Total Assets, Long Term Debt Total Asset , 













Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .515a .265 .252 .36346709 
a. Predictors: (Constant), GO_High, Current Ratio, Market to Book Value, 








EPS, regression analysis, independent variables, government 










t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 








Total Assets .000 .000 .335 6.55
9 
.000 
Market to Book 
Value 
.018 .014 .052 1.32
2 
.187 
Capital Exp .003 .003 .044 .867 .386 
Age .004 .001 .170 3.93
5 
.000 
Current Ratio .018 .006 .119 3.02
7 
.003 


























R Square for ROA. Regression analysis, government ownership (all) 








R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .303a .092 .079 7.21539704 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total Assets, Long Term Debt Total 
Asset , Market to Book Value, Current Ratio, Goverment 






























   




b. Predictors: (Constant), Total Assets, Long Term Debt 
Total Asset , Market to Book Value, Current Ratio, 






ROA, regression analysis, independent variables, government 










t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -.371 .763  -.487 .627 
Goverment 
Ownership 








Current Ratio .245 .120 .089 2.04
7 
.041 
Market to Book 
Value 




Capital Exp .140 .062 .125 2.24
0 
.026 
Age .063 .020 .146 3.07
7 
.002 
Total Assets .001 .001 .023 .410 .682 












R Square for ROE. Regression analysis, government ownership 












1 .425a .180 .169 15.562154 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total Assets, Long Term 
Debt Total Asset , Market to Book Value, Current 

































   
a. Dependent Variable: ROE 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Total Assets, Long Term Debt 
Total Asset , Market to Book Value, Current Ratio, 











 ROE, regression analysis, independent variables, government 











t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .385 1.646  .234 .815 
Goverment 
Ownership 
.074 .027 .116 2.738 .006 
Long Term Debt 
Total Asset 
-.450 .087 -.216 -
5.165 
.000 
Current Ratio .421 .258 .068 1.631 .104 
Market to Book 
Value 
-3.771 .578 -.269 -
6.519 
.000 
Capital Exp .345 .135 .136 2.567 .011 
Age .109 .044 .111 2.470 .014 
Total Assets .005 .003 .084 1.563 .119 















R Square for EPS. Regression analysis, government ownership and 
year effect  
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .505a .255 .244 .36522170 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total Assets, Long Term Debt Total Asset , 















Square F Sig. 
1 Regressi
on 
22.934 7 3.276 24.56
3 
.000b 
Residual 67.094 503 .133   
Total 90.028 510    
a. Dependent Variable: EPS 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Total Assets, Long Term Debt Total Asset , 












EPS, regression analysis, independent variables, government 










t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -.084 .039  -2.172 .030 
Goverment 
Ownership 
-.001 .001 -.042 -1.049 .295 
Long Term Debt 
Total Asset 
-.008 .002 -.152 -3.814 .000 
Current Ratio .018 .006 .118 2.973 .003 
Market to Book 
Value 
.017 .014 .050 1.283 .200 
Capital Exp .002 .003 .028 .555 .579 
Age .004 .001 .173 4.028 .000 
Total Assets .000 .000 .345 6.760 .000 





R Square for ROA. Regression analysis, government ownership (all) 
with year effect  
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .324a .105 .085 7.19023400 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total Assets, Yr2015, Long Term Debt Total 
Asset , Market to Book Value, Current Ratio, Goverment Ownership, 

















Square F Sig. 
1 Regressio
n 
3029.633 11 275.421 5.327 .000b 
Residual 25798.033 499 51.699   
Total 28827.666 510    
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Total Assets, Yr2015, Long Term Debt Total 
Asset , Market to Book Value, Current Ratio, Goverment Ownership, 






















ROA, regression analysis, independent variables, government 










t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 







.009 .012 .031 .697 .486 
Long Term Debt 
Total Asset 
-.144 .040 -.156 -
3.569 
.000 
Current Ratio .247 .119 .090 2.067 .039 
Market to Book 
Value 
-.511 .268 -.083 -
1.902 
.058 
Capital Exp .135 .062 .121 2.162 .031 
Age .062 .020 .144 3.045 .002 
Yr2012 2.010 1.011 .107 1.987 .047 
Yr2013 1.835 1.009 .098 1.820 .069 
Yr2014 1.855 1.007 .099 1.843 .066 
Yr2015 .250 1.009 .013 .248 .804 
Total Assets .001 .001 .024 .422 .673 














R Square for ROE. Regression analysis, government ownership (all) 








Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .439a .193 .175 15.505418 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total Assets, Yr2015, Long Term Debt 
Total Asset , Market to Book Value, Current Ratio, Goverment 













Square F Sig. 
1 Regressi
on 








   
a. Dependent Variable: ROE 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Total Assets, Yr2015, Long Term Debt Total 
Asset , Market to Book Value, Current Ratio, Goverment Ownership, 












ROE, regression analysis, independent variables, government 










t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -1.435 2.133  -.673 .502 
Goverment 
Ownership 
.074 .027 .116 2.750 .006 
Long Term Debt 
Total Asset 
-.446 .087 -.214 -
5.138 
.000 
Current Ratio .420 .257 .067 1.630 .104 
Market to Book 
Value 
-3.668 .579 -.262 -
6.334 
.000 
Capital Exp .334 .134 .132 2.491 .013 
Age .109 .044 .112 2.487 .013 
Yr2012 3.550 2.181 .083 1.628 .104 
Yr2013 2.098 2.175 .049 .964 .335 
Yr2014 3.763 2.171 .089 1.734 .084 
Yr2015 -1.022 2.176 -.024 -.470 .639 
Total Assets .005 .003 .084 1.570 .117 















R Square for EPS. Regression analysis, government ownership (all) 








R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .508a .258 .241 .36592845 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total Assets, Yr2015, Long Term Debt 
Total Asset , Market to Book Value, Current Ratio, Goverment 














Square F Sig. 
1 Regressi
on 
23.210 11 2.110 15.758 .000b 
Residual 66.818 499 .134   
Total 90.028 510    
a. Dependent Variable: EPS 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Total Assets, Yr2015, Long Term Debt Total 
Asset , Market to Book Value, Current Ratio, Goverment Ownership, 













 EPS, regression analysis, independent variables, government 
ownership (all) with year effect. 
 
 




























t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 







-.001 .001 -.043 -
1.047 
.296 
Long Term Debt 
Total Asset 
-.008 .002 -.151 -
3.779 
.000 
Current Ratio .018 .006 .118 2.973 .003 
Market to Book 
Value 
.019 .014 .055 1.380 .168 
Capital Exp .002 .003 .025 .483 .630 
Age .004 .001 .173 4.019 .000 
Yr2012 .063 .051 .060 1.227 .220 
Yr2013 .033 .051 .032 .649 .516 
Yr2014 .027 .051 .026 .524 .601 
Yr2015 .001 .051 .001 .019 .985 
Total Assets .000 .000 .347 6.771 .000 








Jordan Economy Data from 2012-2015 
Economic 
variables 




variation in %) 




variation in %) 
0.2 1.6 1.7 0.9 
Unemployment 
rate 
12.2 12.6 11.9 13.1 
Public debt (% 
of GDP) 
80.2 86.7 89.0 93.4 
Inflation rate 
(CPI, annual 
variation in %) 
4.5 4.8 2.9 -0.9 
Export (USD 
Billion) 
7.9 7.9 8.4 7.8 
External Debt 
(% of GDP) 
59.7 69 67.8 68.6 
  Source from World Economic Data 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
